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IN QUEST OF BROWN'S PROMISE:
SOCIAL RESEARCH AND SOCIAL
VALUES IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Book Review of
TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT
SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE
By Eleanor Wolf. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981. Pp. 392.
$19.95.
Reviewed by Wallace D. Loh*
I. INTRODUCTION
During oral argument in the School Desegregation Cases,' Justice
Frankfurter remarked to counsel, "How to inform the judicial mind, you
know, is one of the most complicated problems." 2 On the one side are the
legal and extralegal (including social science) materials introduced to
help inform judicial deliberation, on the other side is the resulting deci-
sion that settles the controversy and may embody a new rule of law, and
in between is the complex process of evaluating and using the information
presented. These three interrelated aspects of judicial decisionmaking
form the triptych of this article.
There is perhaps no better setting in which to discuss the role of social
research in the courts than that of school desegregation. From its early,
rural, southern beginnings in Brown to its present, urban, northern mani-
festation in the Detroit case of Milliken v. Bradley,3 empirical evidence
has been used in the litigation. In 1954, the Supreme Court declared that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" 4 and ruled that
the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson5 -which for half a
century had legitimated Jim Crow legislation-had "no place ' 6 in the
* Professor of Law, Adjunct Professor of Psychology, University of Washington Law School,
Visiting Professor, University of Houston Law Center, 1982. B.A. 1965, Grinnell College; Ph.D.
1971, University of Michigan; J.D. 1974, Yale University.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), relief determined, 349 U.S. 249 (1955).
2. Quoted in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN v. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 63 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
3. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
5. 163 U.S. 537(1896).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Plessy's doctrine, as it originally ap-
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public schools. The Court also found that segregation of school children
"solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority" and tends
to retard their educational and mental development,7 thereby repudiating
in effect the Social Darwinist premise of Plessy that law-ways cannot
change folkways. 8 Some two decades later, Federal District Court Judge
Stephen Roth held that the Detroit Board of Education-composed of
liberal members, including winners of NAACP awards, who were
unswervingly committed to racial integration9-had purposefully segre-
gated the city's schools. 1o The judge, a conservative Democrat who was
on record prior to the trial as being unsympathetic to involuntary bus-
ing, " then ordered the most sweeping metropolitan busing program in the
history of the Republic. 12 In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 13 the Su-
preme Court quickly struck down the metropolitan remedy but affirmed
the finding of purposeful discrimination in Detroit, thus limiting desegre-
gation to within the city's boundaries (then already sixty-four percent
black and growing). 14 Subsequently, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I)
the Court approved a decree mandating substantial state expenditures to
improve Detroit's mostly black schools. 15 Milliken is the first major set-
back for integration since Brown and may signal the start of a modern
version of Plessy: mostly-separate-but-equal.
Eleanor Wolf, Professor of Sociology at Wayne State University, pro-
vides a detailed account of this litigation in Trial and Error: The Detroit
School Segregation Case. 16 This article reviews the book and uses it as a
plied to public transportation, was squarely repudiated in Browder v. Gayle. 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
Ala.). affd met., 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
7. 347 U.S. at 494.
8. See Bernstein, Plessv v. Ferguson: Conservative Sociological Jurisprudence. 48 J. NEGRO
HIST. 196 (1963).
9. Grant, The Detroit School Case: An Historical Overview. 21 WAYNE L. REv. 851. 854
(1975).
10. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). affd. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
11. He had criticized desegregation as "forced feeding" and urged that "'outsiders" leave the
city alone. See Grant. supra note 9, at 851.
12. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). affd in part and vacated and
remanded in part. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). rev'd. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The plan involved the
busing of 40% of the 780,000 students (from kindergarten to twelfth grade) in 53 school districts, in
order to achieve a ratio of 20 to 30% black to 80 to 70% white in each school. See E. WOLF. TRIAL
AND ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE 236-37 (1981).
13. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
14. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, ruled that there can be no interdistrict remedy
absent both an interdistrict violation and a meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring
school districts to present evidence or be heard on the remedy issue. Id. at 744-53
15. 433U.S 267(1977).
16. (1981). The book expands Wolf's earlier article. Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit
Schools Case. 42 PuB. INTEREST 102 (1976).
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springboard to examine broader issues concerning the uses and limits of
social research in the judicial process. Since judicial reliance on empirical
inquiry may vary according to the problems under consideration, these
issues cannot be addressed in the abstract. They have to be discussed in
the context of a particular substantive problem; hence, the topic chosen
here is school desegregation.
Wolf's book can be appreciated at several levels. It is a detective story
that seeks to unravel a couple of mysteries: how could one of the most
pro-integration school boards in the nation be found culpable of racial
discrimination? And what prompted the extraordinary conversion of the
judge from pretrial skeptic to posttrial champion of massive busing?
Wolf's book is a methodical summary and unrelenting critique of the so-
cial science evidence introduced in the case. The appellate opinions in
Milliken 117 made no reference to empirical data. This kind of documen-
tary research is not common in social-legal scholarship and it yields new
insights into the more subtle effects of empirical evidence on judicial de-
cisionmaking. The testimony relied on studies of local and national
scope, many of which had been cited in other school desegregation cases.
Consequently, the implications of the book extend beyond the circum-
stances of Detroit.
Perhaps the most controversial level at which the book can be read is
the ideological. In Trial and Error, Wolf emerges as one of the chief
sociological rhetoricians of the growing national mood popularly de-
scribed as the "new conservatism." In contrast to the traditional liberal
ideology of the 1950's and 1960's which steadfastly espoused the integra-
tion ideal no matter what the cost, the 1970's and 1980's have seen an
increasing number of apostates in the civil rights movement18 who have
been bitterly derided as "neo-liberal revisionists."' 19 They include legal
scholars, 20 social scientists,21 and black community groups, 22 all of
17. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973); 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Unless one sat through the trial or, as
Wolf did, painstakingly combed through tens of thousands of pages of court transcript, one would not
have realized that voluminous expert testimony had been presented at both the trial and remedy pro-
ceedings.
18. When the Atlanta chapter of the NAACP agreed to a reduction in busing in an exchange for
more black school administrators, it was suspended by the national office. See J. WILKINSON, FROM
BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 233 (1979).
19. Clark, Social Science, Constitutional Rights, and the Courts, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS I (1977).
20. E.g., SHADES OFBROWN" NEw PERSPECTIVESON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (D. Bell ed. 1980).
21. E.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1978); Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90 (1972); Wolf, Northern SchoolDeseg-
regation and Residential Choice, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 63; Coleman, Kelly & Moore, Trends in
School Segregation, 1968-73 (April 2, 1975) (unpublished paper presented at American Educational
Research Association annual meeting, 1975). But see Pettigrew & Green, School Desegregation in
Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1976);
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whom profess opposition to racial discrimination but nonetheless are pro-
foundly skeptical of the validity and effectiveness of school integration
via compulsory busing. Wolf juxtaposes the opposing claims based on
social science and legal doctrines, and by deft argument and counter-
argument attempts to justify the neo-conservative commitment to the sta-
tus quo. It is a heroic effort but, as I shall conclude, a flawed one.
The article is in several parts. Part it briefly revisits Brown and its
progeny. It also summarizes and critiques the associated social research,
with special attention given to the expert testimony presented at the De-
troit trial (as described by Wolf). Part III evaluates the key ideas in
Wolf's book and then analyzes the evolving interpretation of Brown's
promise in light of the normative issues implicated by school desegrega-
tion. Part IV outlines the jurisprudential context for the school desegrega-
tion cases and for the use of social research in law. Part V pulls together
the preceding sections and discusses the different uses of social science
by the courts. These uses reflect the influence of different jurisprudential
approaches to decisionmaking. Finally, the conclusion in Part VI identi-
fies current thematic concerns of the law and social research in this field.
II. LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The law of school desegregation is a rich tapestry of social science
ideas and doctrinal concepts. To see how the social science is woven into
the fabric of judicial decisions, we must begin by sketching the historical
background.23
Pettigrew. Useem. Normand & Smith. Busing: A Review of "The Evidence," 30 PUB. INTEREST 88
(1973): Rossell. A Response to "the 'White Flight' Controversy." 53 PuB. INTEREST 109 (1978).
22. For example. in Dallas' school desegregation case, a "'Black Coalition to Maximize Educa-
tion." composed of "'a substantial body of blacks who are opposed to any escalation in the use of
racial balance remedies to cure the effects of school segregation," sought instead alternative
remedies "to improve educational quality and to eliminate the disparity in academic achievement."
Tasby v. Wright. 520 F. Supp. 683, 690 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In the Nashville litigation. a "dramatic
role reversal" was observed by the court, whereby "a white majority of the school board, acting on
the advice of a white desegregation expert, recommendledl to the Court more busing to achieve more
racial balance." whereas black plaintiffs urged "less busing. more neighborhood characteristics to
the assignment plan, and the permissibility of majority black schools." Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
23. Unless one identifies the legal parameters for empirical research. "there is no assurance that
the particular aspect of the subject being studied at a given time has any special importance. or even
relevance, to the ultimate inquiry." H. BERMAN & W. GREINER. THE NATURE AND FUNCIiONS OF LA%%
16 (4th ed. 1980). Commentators have pointed out that social research (especially psychological
research) on law, though it may validate scientific theories, is often irrelevant to the policy concerns
of lawyers mainly because it does not take into account the legal dimensions of the problem under
study. Elwork. Sales & Suggs, The Trial: A Research Review, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 1. 49 (B. Sales
ed. 1981): Loh. Psycholegal Research: Past and Present. 79 MicH. L. REv. 659. 668 (1981).
"[l]ssues of fact arise out of the law": it is the law (major premise) that renders certain types of facts
Vol. 58:129, 1982
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A. Southern School Desegregation and Social Research
One of the most publicized forensic roles of social science was in
Brown. In lower court proceedings, Kenneth Clark, the plaintiff's leading
expert, testified on studies that purported to show the harmful effects of
segregation on children's personality and learning. 24 On appeal to the Su-
preme Court, he was joined by some thirty other distinguished social sci-
entists in appending to appellant's brief a "Social Science Statement"
that summarized the available research on the consequences of segrega-
tion and the probable effects of desegregation. 25 The "modem authority"
for the Court's landmark ruling was the research of Clark and others,
cited in the now celebrated footnote eleven. 26 "Proof [of the wrongful-
ness of segregation]," said Clark, "had to come from the social psychol-
ogists. "27
The reaction from the legal community was swift and caustic. Edmond
Cahn rightly criticized the methodological shortcomings and unjustified
inferences of Clark's doll-preference experiments. 28 Moreover, he feared
that even if reliable data were tendered on the issue, the merits would be
thought to stand or fall with them, so that a change in scientific results
would force a change in the constitutional findings regarding segregation.
He argued, "I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of
other Americans-rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the sci-
entific demonstrations in these records." ' 29 He also dismissed a poll cited
(minor premise) applicable or not. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in Law, in EvI-
DENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 61 (D. Lerner ed. 1959). The importance of starting with the legal side of
social-legal inquiry was recognized half a century ago: "[T]he first step in the development of legal
psychology [or legal sociology, etc.] should be a[n] . . . analysis of legal situations," and after "the
analysis is made the student of behavior may step in. . .[to] investiga[te] the behavioral hypotheses
.... " Slesinger & Pilpel, Legal Psychology: A Bibliography and a Suggestion, 26 PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL BULL. 677, 680, 681 (1929). This is not to say that social science remains a handmaiden to law.
See infra note 220.
24. In Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), Clark presented white and brown dolls to sixteen black children aged six to nine
years in Clarendon County, South Carolina, where the trial was held. He found that most of the
children identified with and preferred the white doll, even though they recognized that the brown doll
was more like themselves. From this result, Clark inferred that the children had feelings of self-
rejection and inferiority. For a critique of the methodology and debatable inferences of this study, see
Banks, White Preference in Blacks: A Paradigm in Search of a Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 1179 (1976); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 161-65 (1955). See generally R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTIcE 330-31 (1977) (detailed anecdotal account of the Clark tests).
25. Appendix to Appellants' Brief: The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Deseg-
regation: A Social Science Statement, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in
37 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1953).
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 n.1 1 (1954).
27. Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9J. Soc. ISSUES 1,3 (1953).
28. Cahn, supra note 24.
29. Id. at 157-58. Some twenty years later, confronted with revisionist evidence, Clark made a
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:129, 1982
in footnote eleven, showing the nearly unanimous but undocumented
opinions of social scientists on the detrimental impact of segregation, as
"literary psychology." 30 Other legal scholars, too, described the behav-
ioral evidence contained in the "Brandeis brief"-like 3l "Statement" as
"more social than scientific" 32 and "merely corroboratory of common
sense." 33 The footnote was seen as no more than a consolation gesture to
Clark and company for their fidelity to the cause. This debate set the stage
for subsequent assessments of the possibilities and limits of social re-
search in constitutional adjudication.
A year later, during arguments on the implementation of Brown, both
sides relied heavily on social science. Clark urged immediate desegrega-
tion with iron-fisted enforcement by federal officials on the theory that
"change in attitude [follows] change in action." 34 The southern states
argued the opposite theory and proposed a gradual, sweet reasonableness
approach to desegregation under the aegis of local authorities. 35 Faced
with a politically sensitive issue, the absence of judicial precedents. and
conflicting social science recommendations on the timing and mechanics
of desegregation, the Court treaded a fine line between resoluteness and
accommodation. It reached a compromise solution without any mention
remarkable about-face. He warned that . [the business of social justice is too important to be left in
the hands of. . . 'social scientists' who are primarily responsive to majority fashion, prejudices. and
power." He urged "concerned citizens" to "put their faith and trust in our federal courts." Clark.
supra note 19, at 9. See also Clark, Social Policy. Power, and Social Science Research. 43 HARV
EDUC. REV. 113, 120 (1973) ("social scientists are indistinguishable from politicians" and "no more
dependable in the quest for social justice than are other citizens"). The irony. of course. is that
Clark's present fear that a change in social science conclusions will force a change in constitutional
policy was precisely the alarm that Cahn critics sounded in the mid-50's and which Clark then
brushed aside. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role. 5 VILL. L.
REV. 224 (1960).
30. Cahn. supra note 24. at 161.
31. The so-called "Brandeis Brief" was first used by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon. 208
U.S. 412 (1908). to present social, psychological, and economic information in order to establish the
reasonableness of social legislation limiting women's working hours, thereby providing factual sup-
port for the presumption of its constitutionality. See generally Doro. The Brandeis Brief. I I VAND.
L. REV. 783 (1958) (outlining the Brandeis "contextualistic" approach to legal argument). The situa-
tion was different in Brown when the Brandeis Brief was used to attack Jim Crow legislation. The
validity, not just the mere existence of the factual foundation of legislation, was at issue in the deseg-
regation case-unless, as Freund argues, the presumption was reversed because of the racial classifi-
cation. P. FREUND. THE SUPREMtE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (rep. 1972). For the
procedural purpose of shifting the burden to the state to come forward and prove that its actions were
not presumptively unconstitutional, the Court was justified in accepting the social science results with
an uncritical eye.
32. Karst. Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75. 105
33. Black. The Laiwfulness of the Segregation Decisions. 69 YALE L. J. 421. 430 n.25 11960).
34. Brief for Appellants on further reargument at 18. Brown v. Board of Educ.. 349 U.S. 294
(1955). See Clark. supra note 27. at 69-76.
35. E.g.. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Attorney General of Florida. Appendix A. Brown v. Board
of Educ.. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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of empirical findings: desegregation by local school boards, under the su-
pervision of federal district courts, conducted with "all deliberate
speed"-a formula that combined opposite ideas for epigrammatic ef-
fect.36
The first dozen years produced only token desegregation. 37 Brown's
holding underwent a transformation as it was applied by the lower courts.
As it often happens in constitutional adjudication, a gap appeared be-
tween the initial grandiloquent statement of lofty principle and its subse-
quent implementation in specific cases. 38 On remand, Judge Parker inter-
preted Brown to mean that "[t]he Constitution . . .does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination." ' 39 This so-called Parker
Doctrine-that integration and desegregation are descriptive of two dif-
ferent concepts-served to deflect the mandate of Brown short of outright
defiance. It provided the legal justification for tokenism. "Between the
idea and the reality," in the words of T. S. Eliot, "... falls the
Shadow.' '40
The Supreme Court observed in silence from the sidelines the disheart-
ening process of desegregation, mired as it was in delays and obstruc-
tions. 41 Finally, in 1968, it intervened to order the conversion "now" to a
"unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.' '42 Three years later, the Court declared an affirmative obli-
gation to end racially separate schools because they were "vestiges" of
pre-1954 racial assignment laws. 43 Without turning to any of the empiri-
cal evidence introduced in the proceedings below, 44 the Court assumed a
causal link between the former state-imposed (de jure) segregation and
the existing patterns of (de facto) separation in residential neighborhoods
36. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
37. See generally Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 7 (dividing the post-Brown years
into four periods, each of which was characterized by a unique response to the integration decree);
Wilkinson, supra note 19 (a more general treatment of the desegregation problem).
38. In the criminal procedure area, for example, see Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970); see also D. MCBARNET,
CONVICTION: LAW, THE STATE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 46 (1981).
39. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
40. T. S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950, at 56, 58
(1971).
41. The example of examples was the New Orleans desegregation case which involved 41 deci-
sions over 10 years. M. INGER, POLITICS AND REALITY IN AN AMERICAN CITY: THE NEW ORLEANS
SCHOOL CRISIS OF 1960 (1969).
42. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439,437-38 (1968).
43. Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
44. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REV. 411, 452
(1973).
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and schools. 45 By the early 1970's massive school desegregation had ar-
rived in the South, reaching dimensions unrivaled anywhere else in the
nation .46
B. Northern School Desegregation and Social Research
For almost two decades after Brown, the courts generally ignored racial
imbalance in barrio and ghetto schools. 47 Desegregation was deemed a
southern problem. So long as the imbalance was not the product of offi-
cial action and did not have a history of state-sanctioned segregation, it
was not subject to constitutional attack. Two demographic trends, begun
earlier in the century but accelerated in the 1950's, made the racial
disproportion increasingly acute: the northward migration of southern
blacks and the exodus of the white middle class to the suburbs. 48 In 1973.
the Court finally put the North on notice that it too had to comply with
Brown's mandate. It ruled that intentional (de jure) segregative acts by
the Denver school board in a mostly black neighborhood created "a pre-
sumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventi-
tious. ,49 The Court ordered city-wide desegregation when school offi-
cials were unable to overcome the presumption that the wrong done in
one part of the system had infected the whole.
Denver, however, is not representative of the northern urban metropo-
lis, in part because blacks constitute a minority of the city's population.
More typical is Detroit. It has a bull's eye population pattern consisting of
a predominantly black inner core surrounded by rings of white suburbs. A
steady out-migration of whites has left a school population that is largely
45. One could argue that the justification for the decision rested on the theory that the detrimental
effects of the state-mandated segregation of the past carried over to the present generation of students.
Alternately, Fiss suggests that the idea of past de jure or vestigial segregation can be seen as an
attempt to preserve continuity with Brown, though in fact the Court's attention was on the racial
patterns themselves and not with the causal link between past and present. Fiss. The Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation. 38 U. CIII. L. REV. 697. 705
(1971).
46. In 1971. 43.9% of black children in the South attended predominantly white schools, com-
pared to only 27.8% in the North and West. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189. 218 n.3
(1973).
47. Early lawsuits against northern school systems were unsuccessful. Federal appellate courts
denied there was a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation, and the Supreme Court refused
to grant certiorari. See. e.g.. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966). cerl.
denied. 389 U.S. 847 (1967): Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 19631, cert. denied. 377
U.S. 924 (1964).
48. See generally U.S. COMIMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN TIlE
SOUTHIERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66 (1966).
49. Keyesv. SchoolDist. No. 1,413U.S. 189.208(1973).
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black and is forecast to be virtually 100% black by 1990.50 Thus, in De-
troit and other major cities, the problem is not only racially separate
schools, but also racially separate communities within a single metropoli-
tan area. Against this background, the Detroit school case was decided.
The social science testimony presented in the Detroit case, as described
by Wolf based on her analysis of the trial transcript, is not atypical of that
introduced in other northern school cases. 51 It dealt with the causes and
extent of residential and school segregation, the educational and social
psychological consequences of desegregation, and the purportedly uncon-
stitutional conduct of school officials in maintaining racially separate
schools.
1. Residential Segregation and School Segregation
For nearly six weeks during the trial, plaintiffs' expert witnesses set
forth what was considered "the most extensive testimony ever presented
on the interrelationship between segregation in the schools and in hous-
ing. "52 The theory was that government agencies and policies contribu-
ted to residential segregation which, coupled with the seemingly neutral
policy of assignment to neighborhood schools, resulted in racially imbal-
anced schools-that de facto segregation was really de jure segregation
once removed. It was a wholly one-sided presentation. Defendants intro-
duced no rebuttal evidence; under existing case law, 53 school officials
were not responsible for racial imbalances arising solely from demo-
graphic changes.54
According to Wolf, this testimony was of "poor quality," 55 in part
50. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
51. See Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social
Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW & CONTMP. PROBS., winter 1975, at 50.
52. Grant, supra note 9, at 862.
53. Racial imbalance that is not the product of official action and does not have a history of
segregation by law is not subject to equal protection challenge. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
54. On appeal, the issue of racial containment in housing was nimbly sidestepped, perhaps in
order to perpetuate the de jure-de facto distinction. The Sixth Circuit expressly noted that it did not
rely on the housing testimony in upholding the finding of de jure segregation. Milliken v. Bradley,
484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The Supreme Court also said "the
case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations." Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 418 U.S. 717, 728 n.7 (1974). In a footnote to his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart crypti-
cally characterized the causes of residential and school segregation as "unknown and perhaps un-
knowable." Id. at 756 n.2. Karl Taeuber, the noted demographer who testified extensively at trial
responded dryly: "I don't know whether to feel insulted or challenged." Taeuber, Demographic
Perspectives on Housing and School Segregation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 833 (1975).
55. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 70.
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"misleading," 56 and "not the result of a review of research on the mat-
ter" but "a lawyer's argument" to justify a finding of de jure segrega-
tion. 57 Defective as it was, she asserts that it nonetheless "played a cru-
cial role in determining the outcome of the trial. "58 The trial judge was
misled by the testimony into concluding that "racial discrimination, both
public and private" rather than voluntary preferences of blacks or their
lower income, was the chief cause of racial concentrations in housing,
and that there was a "corresponding effect" or reciprocal relationship
between racial patterns in schools and in neighborhoods. 59 Despite inde-
pendent documentation of government complicity in housing segregation
in the 1930's and 1940's,60 not mentioned in the book, Wolf counter-
argues that black residential segregation in the North is merely a "con-
junctural phenomenon involving the acts of millions of households over
the years," such acts consisting in "large part" of "white avoidance"
(read: white prejudice). Since racial concentrations in housing are of long
standing, antedating New Deal policies, they cannot be traced unequivo-
cally to "discriminatory acts by government." 61 What the government
has not done, Wolf says, it should not intervene to undo.
Social science no doubt lacks the tools to disentangle precisely the ef-
fects of government action from the welter of demographic, economic,
and attitudinal factors that influence residential choice. A noted demogra-
pher cautioned that conclusions regarding residential segregation reflect a
"complex interplay of hypotheses and evidence.''62 Wolf, though
conceding that her conclusions are "deductions" from data, 63 is relent-
less in her "cross-examination" of plaintiffs' experts. 64 Every datum
56. Id. at 77.
57. Id. at 33.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Bradley v. Milliken. 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971). affd. 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973). rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
60. Federal agencies encouraged homeowners to include racially restrictive convenants in deeds
which the courts did not refuse to enforce until Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). An F.H.A.
Underwriting Manual at the time urged that "'properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes" in order to preserve neighborhood stability. Quoted in Goodman. De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275. 332 & n. 192
(1972). See also Taylor. The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analvsis of Milliken v.
Bradley. 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751, 765-66 (1975) (historically, action at all levels of government
helped to foster and maintain racially segregated neighborhoods).
61. E. WOLF. supra note 12, at 33
62. Taeuber. supra note 54, at 847.
63. E. WOLF. supra note 12, at 204.
64. For example, there was expert testimony that residential choice for blacks was negligible.
The results of a national poll showed that 64-66% of blacks want to live in integrated neighborhoods.
while one-fifth or less prefer all-black areas. Wolf combined the latter figure with one-half of the
undecided group to conclude that a proportion "'approachling] 30% favor all-black neighborhoods."
Id. at 39. This new figure was sufficiently large to support the inference that own-group preference-
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supporting a finding of discrimination is reinterpreted; no theory of state
wrongdoing is left unchallenged. Even if it cannot be proven that state
policies were the sole cause of segregated housing, it is undeniable that
they at least legitimated and perpetuated this condition. Wolf's position
should lead her to conclude-which she does not-that Brown was
wrongly decided, because segregated public schools existed in parts of
the South as a matter of social custom prior to the enactment of Jim Crow
legislation.
2. Educational and Social Psychological Effects ofDesegregation
Numerous educational psychologists and other experts for both sides
were nearly unanimous in their testimony on the personal benefits of de-
segregation. They asserted that racial and/or social class heterogeneity in
classrooms improved the academic achievement, aspirations, and self-
esteem of black students without any corresponding detriment to white
students. Desegregation was also said to reduce prejudice and promote
intergroup relations at an early age. One-race schools breed intolerance
and have long-range fallout effects on the level of racial disharmony in
society at large. The experts also minimized or denied any educational
differences between white and black children upon entry into the schools,
claiming in any event that teacher expectations and enhanced educational
resources would offset or overcome them.
Wolf evaluates each of these assertions and finds them "confused or
inaccurate.' 65 In many instances, she is certainly correct in charging that
the research literature does not quite support the claims made by the inte-
gration-minded experts. 66 They were engaged in "law office social sci-
ence. "67 But Wolf is hardly innocent in the craft of advocacy either. She
not discrimination-'"would make a considerable contribution" to residential segregation. Id. Wolf
also cited other surveys that indicate that blacks are concerned not so much with actually living next
to whites as with the right to do so. It may well be, as she concludes, that if there were truly open
occupancy, there would still be voluntary enclaves of mostly black areas as there are of predomi-
nantly Jewish and other ethnic areas. Ties of kinship and friendship channel residential behavior.
This is a non sequitur because truly free access is not the norm for blacks. In any event, so long as
there is no way to determine how much of the racial concentration is voluntary and how much is due
to private or public discrimination, it cannot be concluded that "prospects for stable residential mix-
tures seem dim." Id. at 41-42.
65. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 101.
66. A glaring example was the statement made by an expert that the landmark "Coleman Re-
port" did not find that social-economic status was a chief source of variation in academic achieve-
ment. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 106. The opposite is true: "A simple general statement of the
major result is that the closest portion of the child's social environment-his family and his fellow
students-affect his achievement most .... "Coleman, A Brief Summary of the Coleman Report,
in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTuNrrY 259 (1969).
67. "Law Office History" was coined by Kelly to describe the opposing briefs by noted histori-
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too marshalled every possible scrap of evidence in favor of her desired
interpretation and doctored, twisted, or omitted all evidence to the con-
trary. For example, it is simply untrue, as she states based upon only one
cited study, that there is a "possibly adverse impact of classrooms with
low achievement averages upon higher-achieving (mostly white) stu-
dents. "68 There is near consensus in the literature on the absence of any
negative effects of desegregation on the achievement of white students. 69
3. Unconstitutional Behavior of School Authorities
A basic teaching of the post-Brown cases is that there is no judicial
remedy for segregated schools without first establishing a constitutional
violation by some level of government.70 Evidence of purposeful discrim-
ination is the "trigger" that fires the "cannon" of mandatory desegre-
gation. 7' A court must find the smoking gun before it can order that the
smoke be cleared. Judge Roth found several kinds of unconstitutional
practices by Detroit school officials: building new schools in locations
that would result in their becoming mostly one-race schools; busing black
but not white children; using optional attendance zones in changing
neighborhoods to enable whites to avoid going to mostly black schools:
and manipulating boundary lines to perpetuate racial separation. These
findings were sustained by the appellate courts, but Wolf dismisses the
evidence as "approach[ing] the absurd," 72 and in some cases as "inade-
quate" and "trivial." 73
Judge Roth's opinion, paradoxically, devoted more space to praising
the pro-integration efforts of the Detroit School Board than to discussing
its purported violations. He admitted that "if racial segregation ... is an
evil, then it should make no difference whether we classify it as de jure or
de facto." 7 4 Since no-fault liability is impossible under present law, Wolf
ans. submitted in the second round of the Brown appeals, that examined the circumstances surround-
ing the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Kelly. Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair. 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122 n. 13, 143-45.
68. E. WOLF. supra note 12, at 230-31.
69. See Weinberg. The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Acadenic Achiei elent:
A Review of the Research. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.. Spring 1975. at 241: see generally N. ST.
JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN 34-36. 157-62 (1975).
70. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717. 737 (1974): Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.413 U.S. 189.
198(1973).
71. See Fiss. supra note 45. at 705.
72. E. WOLF. supra note 12. at 201.
73. Id. at 202. For example. while she concedes that whites were rarely bused to black schools.
she argues that one-way busing of blacks is justifiable to relieve overcrowding, and such overcrowd-
ing was found only in black schools. Id. at 178.
74. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971). qf'd. 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973). rev'd. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Vol. 58:129. 1982
The Detroit School Desegregation Case
argues that "[i]t is hard to escape the conclusion that his inclusion of
school violations was a reluctant concession to the requirements of legal
precedent.''75 She derides the linkage between the violations and segre-
gated schools as an "unsubstantiated causal theory," 76 "illogical,', 77 and
"a kind of legal hocus-pocus," 78 that is "deceptive and harmful to judi-
cial credibility." 79 "It is astonishing," she writes, "that sociologists and
demographers have not challenged this [causal] analysis." 80 Her implica-
tion is that the doctrine of de jure violations is judicial legerdemain
whereby color-blind actions are transformed into color-based culpability.
In short, then, Wolf's thesis about the sources of school and residential
segregation can be stated as follows. Segregated schools are the product
not of official discrimination but of neutral policies of neighborhood at-
tendance superimposed upon racially separate neighborhoods. The latter,
in turn, also result not from official discrimination but from nonactionable
"white avoidance" over the years. She does not deny that some official
violations have occurred in the past, but insists that "racial predominance
violates the constitution only if it can be shown that acts of school author-
ities played a substantial causal role." 8 '
Wolf is right in asserting as an empirical matter that if official miscon-
duct contributed to only a small proportion of the variance in racial
makeup of the schools, such actions are not the cause of segregation. But
the issue is not the marginal increment in school segregation due to these
actions, which is nearly impossible to measure. The issue is whether
school and state officials should be held responsible even if their role in
causing segregation in the past and/or legitimating racial imbalances in
the present was small or unmeasurable. What is required is a normative
judgment, not more sophisticated "sociological-demographic analy-
sis." 82 Her criticism of the attenuated causal nexus is really a quarrel with
the substantive law rather than with the quality of the social research pre-
sented at the trial. The Supreme Court has never demanded that there be
"substantial" unconstitutional behavior for a finding of wrong. Indeed,
75. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 160.
76. Id. at 243.
77. Id. at 257.
78. Id. at 292.
79. Id. at 243. Wolf is not alone in observing that the causation is a legal fiction. See Columbus
School Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479, 489 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Dayton School Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542, 542-43 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fiss, supra note 43.
80. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 335 n.26.
81. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 257.
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its decisions have set a relatively low standard83 that makes it difficult for
school authorities to rebut the prima facie showing of purposeful discrim-
ination. 84 This is because with a problem as complex as northern school
segregation, it may not be possible to identify any single smoking gun.
There could be many smoking guns. In any event, there is smoke every-
where-and Wolf's position is that the smoke cannot be cleared until the
gun is found. 85
III. SOCIAL VALUES IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
A. The Liberal Ideology
Law is an instrument of social policy. Wolf's disagreement with the
present law of school desegregation reflects, at bottom, a disagreement
with the social values that the law embodies. Judge Roth observed that
-[t]he task we are called upon to perform is a social one which society
has been unable to accomplish. In reality our courts are called upon in
these school cases to attain a goal through the educational system by us-
ing law as a lever. "86 There are two basic normative questions that under-
lie school desegregation. First, do we as a nation want to have an inte-
grated society, relying on integrated public schools as a stepping-stone
towards that ultimate goal? Second, if yes, is compulsory busing the de-
sired means for achieving integrated schools? Traditional liberal ideology
answers both questions affirmatively. The societal ideal is "one [racially
integrated] nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Public
education, Brown declared, "is the very foundation of good citizenship,"
the "principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.''87
Historically, it has been the main avenue for the assimilation of different
ethnic groups into mainstream America. It is an article of faith that
"Negro and white children playing innocently together in the schoolyard
are the primary liberating promise in a society imprisoned by racial con-
83. The vestigial segregation notion. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ.. 402 U.S
1, 15 ( 1971). implies a highly attenuated causal nexus.
84. Keyesv. SchoolDist. No. 1.413U.S. 189(1973).
85. Wolf's position can be recast in terms of hypothesis-testing in applied social research Her
criticisms are ostensibly directed at the conclusions of the studies cited in the expert testimony. In
fact, the point of contention lies with the standard of proof required for rejecting the null-hypothesis
and not with the substantive results. Wolf is unwilling to accept as true any findings that do not reach
a high level of significance (say .001), even though the scientific community has accepted a lower
decision criterion for false positives (say. 10) in the given area of applied research. The lax standard
is defensible if numerous replications of the study consistently show the expected. but weak. treat-
ment effect.
86. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1973). rev'd. 418 U.S. 717 (19741.
87, Brown v. Board of Educ.. 347 U.S. 483. 493 (1954).
Vol. 58:129, 1982
The Detroit School Desegregation Case
sciousness." 88 Because of widespread residential segregation, busing be-
came virtually synonymous with integrated schooling.
Wolf scorns the scientific basis of the liberal ideology. "[T]here is
enough contrary evidence. . to justify a considerable degree of skepti-
cism" about the factual premises of the integrationist ideal. 89 " [T]he case
for the school as the most effective arena for the work of societal unifica-
tion rests upon empirical propositions," none of which is (for her) "self-
evident" or proven. Such "empirical verification" is required because
"the case for mandatory integration" is based "largely" on instrumental-
ist grounds. 90 Her approach exemplifies a broader style of thought de-
scribed as "technocratic" 91 or, in an earlier age, as "scientistic." ' 92 In
this view, science is the measure of all things. The quest for the New
Jerusalem is converted into "sociological-demographic" analysis; the
hope that the lion will lay down with the lamb becomes a matter of techni-
cal know-how.
B. Facts, Values, and the Adversary Process
Although the days of any serious claim to a value-free social science
are long behind us, 93 Wolf claims to see a clear and "entirely proper"
distinction between "ethical values" and "current scientific evi-
dence." ' 94 She professes to engage in "objective and systematic" in-
quiry95 while integration-minded social scientists take the stand to grind
ideological axes. Their testimony is a "caricature of social science," 96
"scarcely above the level of pop sociology.' '97 To claim such privileged
88. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 419 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hob-
son, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
89. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 257.
90. Id. at 256-57.
91. T. ROSZAK, THE MAKING OFA COUNTER-CULTURE 5-22 (1969).
92. A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 405 (1964), describes scientism as "the pernicious
exaggeration of both the status and function of science in relation to our values."
93. Values intrude in every phase of scientific inquiry: in the selection of problems for study, M.
WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 21-22 (1949); in the formulation of hy-
potheses, Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology. 81 YALE L.J. 1086, 1093-95 (1972); and in the
handling and interpretation of data, G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1041 (1944).
94. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 251-52. The positivist tradition in social science has always
insisted on value-neutrality in the analysis-if not in the selection-of problems as a precondition
for objectivity. Unless scientists are indifferent to individual and collective purposes, they risk setting
out to confirm what they already believe. See generally M. REIN. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
37-43 (1976).
95. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 258.
96. Id. at 260.
97. Id. at 262.
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exemption from ideological bias by reason of exposing such bias in others
is a kind of epistemological self-righteousness.
A clear-cut dichotomy beween facts and values-between the -is'"
and the "ought"--is artificial. There is no immaculate conception of
facts. Observation is a goal-directed activity and is not immune from
value contamination. 98 All inquiry is selective; some facts are attended to
and others are neglected. Empirical knowledge of the social order is in-
terwoven with the beliefs and ideologies one holds. Truth is not found in
facts themselves but in the way they are organized in relation to some
interpretive scheme. 99 This scheme shapes one's perceptions of social re-
ality and explains why things are the way they seem to be. 100 To recog-
nize that descriptive and normative thought co-mingle is not to say that
scientific inquiry is impossible.' 01 Values shape scientific statements
(which are subject to verification by the methods of science), but that
does not render them value statements (which are empirically unverifi-
able). 102
Wolf attributes the slanted testimony of the experts at the Detroit trial
not only to their liberal ideology, but also to the nature of the adversary
process which pushes them into advocacy roles. It is "absurd," she says,
to use trial procedures "to inform the judicial mind" of social science.
The courtroom is a "poor classroom." "There are not two sides to purely
factual matters any more than there are two answers to a problem in arith-
metic, nor is the answer somewhere in the middle."'10 3 Science has
98. "Facts do not speak for themselves." Kaplan, supra note 92, at 375. "All the so-called
'facts* of science imply for their meaning ajudgment of value." C. CHURCHMAN. TtIEORYOF EXPERn
MENTAL INFERENCE viii (1948).
99. This is one of the chief concerns of the sociology of knowledge: how does one know when
one's capacity to inquire is bounded by one's position in time and location in society? See K.
MANNHEIM, ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1952).
100. There are different ways in which values, expressed or subconscious, influence empirical
research. For example, conflicting expert claims over "'white flight" stem in part from differences in
measurement which, in turn, reflect competing social values. Suppose that in a given jurisdiction
there are 200,000 white students, comprising 80% of the school population. After desegregation is
instituted. 40,000 of these students transfer out to private or suburban schools, so that the percentage
of white students changes to 76.2. Some researchers conclude that this 3.8% drop is "'minimal."
especially if white enrollment stabilizes thereafter. Others. looking at the same figures. conclude that
white flight is "massive," since 20,000 represents one-fifth of all the white students. Ideology colors
one's view of whether the cup of reform is half full or half empty. For a discussion of other ways in
which values permeate social research, see M. REIN, supra note 94, at 80-92.
101. Rejection of a value-free social science does not require espousal of a value-partisan social
science (such as. for example. Marxist analysis, in which the ideology of class conflict informs all
research, and new information merely reinforces this ideology). There is the in-between position of
trying to be conscious of the values' premises and to subject them to critical review. See M. REIN.
supra note 94, at 13-14.
102. See Gouldner. Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology. 9 SOC. PRoB. 199
(1962).
103. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 262.
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"safeguards and restraints that help to minimize" distortions created by
one's biases, but "these are almost entirely absent at trial." 0 4 She pro-
poses, instead, panels of impartial experts (drawn from learned societies
or composed of joint lawyer-social scientist teams) or "factfinders from
each side" who would present a "report of agreed-upon data" to the
court. 105 Other social scientists, including those with a liberal tilt, have
also faulted the adversary process for distorting fact-determinations of
science. 106
One commonly suggested means of dealing with the intrusion of values
in empirical study is simply increased self-awareness and disclosure of
them. 107 But researchers may not be conscious of the ideological scheme
in which they operate, any more than fish are aware of the medium in
which they swim. The adversary process can help expose these normative
assumptions. It is precisely because there is no scientific consensus on the
kinds of complex facts implicated in social policy matters-facts based
upon an intricate structure of data and inferences, not upon simple mathe-
matics-that they are at issue in litigation. Even physical science propo-
nents of a "science court"-a forum in which controverted factual (not
policy) issues are decided by scientifically-trained decisionmakers-
agree that an adversary relation is "necessary for the proper resolution of
scientific questions." 108 It provides an institutional check on experts who
might foist their preferences on policy in the guise of scientific expertise.
Moreover, the processes of authority yield finality to competing claims of
fact more cheaply, categorically, and immediately than the processes of
science. To preserve social order, disputes must be resolved one way or
another even in the absence of complete information. Science is inden-
104. Id. at 274.
105. Id. at 262. Other commentators, too, have pointed out the "inadequacy of the judicial ma-
chinery" for learning about legislative facts. Hart & McNaughton, supra note 23, at 63 (there is a
'strange neglect of problems of how legislative facts are to be determined by a court"); Note, Social
and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61
HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1948). Several proposals have been put forth, ihcluding a "Ministry of
Justice," but nothing much has come of them. See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV.
113 (1921). See also Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the Adver-
sary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280 (1980).
106. The authority and prestige of social science is said to derive from its "objectivity." "When
science is explicitly politicized its image [of objectivity] is tarnished and its authority wanes. By
bringing it into the adversarial confines of law, it is rendered controversial and sometimes impotent."
Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4 L. & HuM. BEH.
147, 183 (1980). See also Sperlich, supra note 105 (arguing that the courts ought to establish meth-
ods of validating any scientific evidence that they use in making social policy decisions).
107. "A 'disinterested social science' is . . . pure nonsense. It never existed, and it will never
exist. We can strive to make our thinking rational in spite of this, but only by facing the valuations,
not by evading them." Myrdal, quoted in Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 669 (1960).
108. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058, 1066 (1977).
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tured to tomorrow's evidence; faced with uncertainty, it withholds judg-
ment. Law, however, has a device for definitive settlement. It simply al-
locates the loss to the party that failed to sustain the burden of proof. The
confrontation inherent at trial also helps bring issues to a head. Cross-
examination puts to affirmative use the inevitable bias of experts by re-
vealing the weaknesses of the other side. The adversary system ensures
that opposing views are raised. 109 The irony is that Wolf's book disproves
her own argument that confrontation distorts scientific factfinding. She is
a consummate advocate and her evaluation of the expert testimony at the
trial represents a formidable example of "forensic social science." 10 We
shall never know, of course, if the trial outcome would have been differ-
ent if she had testified for the defense. I I It is safe to say that if there was
"trial and error" in the Detroit case, it was for want of an adversary
relation between the litigants, not because there was too much confronta-
tion. As one commentator put it, it was a "sweetheart suit." 112
C. The New Conservative Ideology
In the final two chapters, Wolf drops the scientific veil and reveals her
ideological colors. She denounces mandatory busing on the grounds that
it does not "appeal to [the] self-interest" of blacks (because there is no
proof of its beneficial consequences) and it "lack[s] moral authority"
109. In fact, social scientists have argued that "'the scientific enterprise as a whole follows an
adversary model." though without the formalized procedures of law. Peer review and critical replica-
tions of studies are analogues of "cross-examination." Levine. Scientific Method and the Adversary
Model: Some Preliminarv Thoughts. 28 AN. PSYCHOLOGIST 661. 669 (1974).
110. See Rivlin, Forensic Social Science. 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 25 (1973). The idea is that
teams of scholars would prepare briefs for or against policy positions. The criterion of evaluation in a
.. public policy court" would not be whether they are "balanced and objective" but whether they are
"'convincing."
Ill. In other cases where revisionist and integrationist social scientists have squared with each
other, the courts have purported to reject the evidence of both sides but still granted an integration
remedy. In the Boston school case, the First Circuit said in exasperation:
Throughout this series of submissions this court has been burdened with reports written for
sociologists by sociologists utilizing sophisticated statistical and mathematical techniques. We
lack the expertise to evaluate these studies on their merits. We do come to one conclusion.
however. The relationship between white flight and court ordered desegregation is a matter of
heated debate among experts ....
The court then proceeded to reject all these materials as "irrelevant to the issues before us." Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401. 421 n.29, 420 n.29 (Ist Cir.). cert. denied. 426 U.S. 935 (1976. Like-
wise, in ruling against ability-tracking in the Washington, D.C. schools, Judge Skelly Wright com-
plained that the expert testimony of both sides was "'tainted by a vice well known in the statistical
trade-data shopping and scanning to reach a preconceived result." Applying -common sense." he
reached the decision "'based upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward moral and constitutional
arithmetic." Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971).
112. Rossum. A Sweetheart Suit. NAT'I REv.. Oct. 30. 198 1. at 1279.
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(because of the contrived fiction of de jure violations). "13 She questions
not only the means for but also the ends of integrated schools in an inte-
grated society: "[I]t is hard to see why such heterogeneous association
between ethnic groups should be considered a goal which is either attain-
able or urgently required." 1 4 Other critics of busing do not go as far as
Wolf. They say they are in favor of neighborhood schools, not against
racial integration. A clean separation between means and ends is difficult
to maintain. Multiple roads to Rome is a poor model for the pursuit of
values; basic values do not exist independently of their instrumentalities
but are defined by them. Racial integration is an abstraction and ultimate
ends are appraised in terms of the means they call for. Ends determine the
means and vice versa." 15 Wolf's position has the virtue of consistency.
*Rejection of busing in the face of massive residential segregation implies,
in large measure, rejection of integrated schools and an integrated soci-
ety.
The neo-conservative vision of the preferred society, as articulated by
Wolf, comes at the end of the nearly thirty-year journey of school deseg-
regation from the South to the North. The thesis of Brown (separate-is-
inherently-unequal) is giving way to the antithesis of a modernized, de
facto version of Plessy (mostly-separate-but-equal). The moral logic
which once seemed so simple and irrefutable is being replaced by a social
science at once complex and uncertain. My purpose here is not to pass on
the merits of the new social philosophy, but to examine its intellectual
origins in evolving interpretations of Brown's promise and in changing
social-political conditions. This analysis will place the Detroit case in
perspective and suggest the contours of the emerging synthesis in the law
and social research on school desegregation.
D. Evolving Interpretations of Brown: Input and Output Perspectives
Depending on one's view of what Brown promised, it stands as a mon-
ument to unfulfilled hopes (racially segregated schools remain the norm
in most large cities today)"16 or to judicial power to effect social change
(it did, quite simply, bury Jim Crow). 117 There is a fundamental ambigu-
ity in Brown regarding the constitutional entitlement it created and the
113. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 293.
114. Id.at300.
115. A. KAPLAN, supra note 92, at 393-96.
116. The 20 largest school districts in the country have an average of 60% minority enrollment.
In some (e.g., Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago), the figure is 80%. SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION Viii (D. Bell ed. 1980).
117. "The promise of Brown was realized. Black children may not be denied admittance to any
school on account of their race .. " N. GLAZER, supra note 21, at 127.
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remedy it implied upon its violation. This ambiguity has colored the sub-
sequent development of all racial discrimination law.
On the one hand, Brown can be interpreted as proscribing color-
conscious policies and actions that result in racial exclusion. Official
apartheid is inherently wrong because it rests upon assumptions of racial
superiority and inferiority that are repugnant to American aspirations of
equality. The remedy for its violation is color-blind decisionmaking:
"equal educational opportunit[y]." 118 The emphasis is on equality of ac-
cess to schools rather than on the quality of the schooling. This is an
"input perspective" on the system of segregation. It seeks to identify and
neutralize the specific "villains" who are the "cause" of the wrong.
On the other hand, Brown can be seen as safeguarding minority chil-
dren against the social, psychological, and educational harms said to re--
sult from racial segregation. The constitutional right is defined in terms of
the consequential injury. The remedy for its breach is color-conscious de-
cisionmaking: racial integration.1 19 This relief promises more than just
open access and an end to racial exclusion. It mandates deliberate racial
mixture in order to bestow upon the underclass the purported advantages
of exposure to the upperclass. 120 This is an "output perspective" on seg-
regation. 121 It looks to the results of segregation, irrespective of its cause,
with the purpose of improving the lot of the constitutionally protected
group.
Through the years, liberals have clung steadfastly to the original under-
standing of Brown that racial integration and equal educational opportu-
nity are inextricably related-the former guarantees the latter. When
schools were in fact separate and unequal, pragmatic and moral consider-
ations supported the integrationist strategy. Because white-dominated
school boards favored white schools, black children had to go to the same
schools attended by white children in order to receive the same educa-
tional package. -[T]o get what the white kids have, you must go where
the white kids are." 122
118. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
119. Logically, this remedy is inconsistent with the race-neutral remedy under the input perspec-
tive.
120. One court has termed this the "osmosis effect." Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167. 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
121. This input/output analysis draws from similar distinctions made by Fiss between process-
orientation/result-orientation and by Freeman between perpetrator/victim interpretations. Fiss. The
Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after Brow n
v. Board of Education, 41 U. Cin. L. REv. 742, 764-70 (1974). See Freeman. Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrinination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine. 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049. 1052-57 (1978).
122. Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New Phases ti the Continuih Quest for
Quality Schools. 1970 Wis. L. REv. 257, 275 (1970).
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Today, new developments on several fronts-intradistrict equalization
of educational funding; widespread white and emerging black opposition
to involuntary busing; changing demographic patterns that frustrate in-
tradistrict desegregation; doubts about the claimed benefits of racial inte-
gration in the classroom-render school desegregation an increasingly
elusive remedy in the nation's metropolitan areas. The revisionist view
does not equate the right to equal educational opportunity with the right to
an integrated education. Instead, it reinterprets Brown as promising only
nondiscriminatory access, a modern version of the old Parker Doctrine
that desegregation-does-not-mean-integration. 123
E. The Detroit Case: Through-Put Perspective
Pressed by competing demands for busing and for neighborhood
schools, the Milliken Court strove for a balance between activism and
restraint. Consistent with its other post-Brown decisions, it avoided any
finding on the harm of segregation. If the wrong were defined in terms of
its effects rather than its cause, then racial imbalances in every sphere of
life, whether de jure or de facto, would have to be eradicated "root and
branch" 124-a true "Greening of America."1 25 The output perspective
implicates system-wide relief. The Court, however, has wisely abstained
from a sweeping, panoramic analysis of segregation. It has not stigma-
tized all fruits of past segregation as original sin. An equality-cum-inte-
gration remedy on any large scale could have a dislocative impact on the
white majority. Neo-conservatives fear that massive racial balancing
would undermine the social-political consensus of our multi-ethnic soci-
ety. ' 26 What the Court has done, instead, in this case and in others,127 is
to attribute the "cause" of segregation to specific "villains" -including
integration-minded school boards-and find them culpable of de jure vio-
lations. Although Wolf reviles this causal analysis as unscientific and
"legal hocus-pocus,"' 128 it is a pragmatic means of distinguishing be-
tween permissible and impermissible forms of racial imbalance depend-
ing upon the equities of a particular case. The requirement of proximate
causation implicit in intentional discrimination serves to limit the wide-
spread allocation of blame. If everyone is responsible, nobody is.
123. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
124. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
125. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
126. N. GLAZER, supra note 21, at 168-69.
127. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
128. E. WOLF, supranote 12, at292.
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In the Detroit case, the Court adopted an input perspective on the viola-
tion, but did not confine the remedy to guaranteeing equal opportu-
nity 29-'the proper objective of public policy," according to the new
conservative view. 130 It recognized that a color-blind remedy can be and
is "an obstacle to school integration;"' 131 facially-neutral decisions can
result in disproportional racial impact. The Court steered a middle-of-the-
road course between color-conscious and color-blind remedial strategies.
Milliken H132 affirmed the trial court's decree that the State of Michigan
and the Detroit School Board each expend $5.8 million for compensatory
education, training, and counseling programs for students, faculty, and
staff of the city schools, in addition to any intradistrict busing and in lieu
of any interdistrict busing. 133 It signaled the end of the integration line of
Brown and the start of the neo-Plessy doctrine of mostly-separate-but-
equal, 134 at least where demographic conditions such as those of Detroit
prevail.
This outcome suggests a third way of analyzing the promise of Brown:
a "through-put perspective." The preceding two perspectives tend to
slight the education component in Brown v. Board of Education. 135 They
focus on the inputs of discriminatory actions that produce racial imbal-
ances, or on the outputs of new racial balances and social-educational
improvements. The through-put perspective attends more to the quality of
the schooling than to racial considerations.1 36 Milliken II should be seen
129. There is no agreed-upon definition of equal educational opportunity. For different formula-
tions, see Coleman, The Concept of Equalitv of Educational Opportunity. 38 HARV. EDUc RE'. 7
(1968): Gordon. Toward Defining Equality of Educational Opportunitv. in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 423 (1972).
130. N. GLAZER, supra note 20. at 168.
131. Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning. in SHADES OF BROWv: NEW PERSPECTIVES O
ScHOOL DESEGREGATION 37 (D. Bell ed. 1980).
132. Milliken v. Bradley. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
133. The School Board welcomed the opportunity to dip into the state treasury in consideration
for giving up some of its autonomy. The State of Michigan. the 'real' and reluctant defendant, was
compelled to contribute because the Detroit school system was "chaotic and incapable of effective
administration.~ Id. at 296 (Powell, J.. concurring). Exigency tends to create its own remedial rules.
134. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. The Browin and neo-Plessv doctrines need not
be read as mutually exclusive. Integration continues unabated on an intradistrict basis. There is a lot
of "'mopping-up" to be done in small- and medium-sized locations where integration is possible
without widespread busing. Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Bradley Era. 21 WAYNE L.
REV. 813. 818 (1975). In large urban centers with a mostly black student population. integration may
well be coming to an end.
135. Some northern school administrators, recognizing that their schools have "always been
segregated" and that "'it is a given that [they] are going to be segregated.- are now shifting their
efforts to "addressing education rather than desegregation." Go to the Head of the Class.
NEWSWEEK. Oct. 4, 1982, at 64, 65. See generally Aleinikoff, The Linits of Litigation: Putting the
Education Back into Brown v. Board of Education, 80 MICH. L. REV. 896 (1982) (discussing reinter-
preting Brown in terms of quality education rather than desegregation).
136. Another manifestation of judicial concern with intraschool policies that affect educational
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against the background of a growing "effective education movement" in
the black community that rejects racial integration as necessary to black
educational achievement. 137 This movement subscribes to the belief that
predominantly black schools that "incorporate the cultural wisdom and
experience of black families and meaningfully collaborate with parents
and community" can foster academic excellence. 138
Table 1 summarizes the three perspectives on the constitutional entitle-
ment and remedy promised by Brown. The doctrinal difficulty with the
Table I
Perspectives on Brown's Promise
Brown's Promise
entitlement
Input
Perspectives
Output
Perspectives
Through-put
Perspectives
through-put
remedy
perspective is that it offers a new remedy without a corre-
effectiveness is the decisions proscribing the use of standardized aptitude and intelligence tests for
placement of students (including a disproportionate number from minority races) in separate and
usually inferior educational tracks or in "educable mentally retarded" programs. Larry P. v. Riles,
495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affdsub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
137. See supra note 22. For over a decade, Derrick Bell has criticized the single-minded pursuit
of integration in lieu of quality schooling. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 431-44 (2d
ed. 1980); Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma. 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 518 (1980).
138. S. LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART: RELATIONSHIPS BETwEEN FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS 129
(1978). In contrast, integration of a few low-income blacks into an upper-income, all-white school
means racial assimilation-'"socializing nonwhite students to act, speak and believe very much like
white students"-and can wreak psychological and educational havoc on the black children. R.
RiST, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN: SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 15 (1978).
151
dejure segregation right to equal
(color-conscious (color-blind)
decisions) are educational
inherently unequal opportunity
freedom from right to integrated
social-educational (color-conscious)
harms of education
segregation
(undefined) right to effective
education
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sponding redefinition of the underlying right that triggers it. Educational
effectiveness is nonactionable 139 because the Court has ruled that the
fourteenth amendment does not embrace a fundamental guarantee of
quality education, 140 and no right in Brown supports educational remedies
to equalize racially separate schools. Milliken II and subsequent lower
court decisions' 4' have nimbly sidestepped this issue by finding de jure
violations and using this fiction as the constitutional peg upon which to
hang the effective education remedy. 42
In summary, the Court in the Detroit case takes on the role of a virtuoso
playing two keyboards. On the left keyboard, it plays the traditional lib-
eral music; on the right, the new conservative sound. To the first audi-
ence, the notes of racial equality give courage to carry on with reform: to
the second audience, the score of equal opportunity gives assurance that
the existing class structure will not be fundamentally altered. The playing
of both keyboards indicates the dilemma of resolving conflicting claims
of constitutional dimension. The Court opted, as it sometimes does when
faced with a lack of consensual values, for a kind of rough justice, a Solo-
monic compromise rather than a clear choice between the competing in-
terests. 143 It gave dignity and credibility to both claims and framed a rem-
edy that attempted to split the baby, though perhaps unevenly. By
recognizing and articulating the felt needs of the age, the Court assisted in
the ongoing creation of national values that set the framework within
which the political processes of government act to resolve the conflict. 144
139. Jones. School Desegregation. 86 YALE L. J. 378. 379 (1976) (letter to the editor).
140. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). the Court refused to
order interdistrict equalization of school funding on the grounds that education was not a fundamental
right protected by the due process clause. Some state supreme courts, however, have granted such
relief based on state constitutions. Serrano v. Priest. 18 Cal. 3d 728. 557 P.2d 929. 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976), cert, denied. 432 U.S. 907 (1977): Seattle School Dist. No. I v State. 90 Wn. 2d 476.
585 P.2d 71 (1978). It is an alternative to desegregation litigation as a means for improving educa-
tional effectiveness.
141. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Tex. 1981): Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd.
of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
142. The risk of this makeshift justification according to Aleinikoff. supra note 135. at 917-20.
is that once a school system has cleansed itself of the vestiges of segregation, there will no longer be a
violation to activate the educational remedy. Under Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.
402 U.S. I .31-32 (1971). schools are not "'required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished ," On
the other hand, if de jure violations is as malleable a concept as the Court has made it appear to be in
the Detroit case, improper state action can always be found.
143. See. e.g.. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (racial quotas in
aflirmative action admissions are impermissible but race is a factor that can be taken into account):
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to warning of silence as a compromise between
outright ban of police interrogations and uncontrolled questioning): Brown v. Board of Educ.. 349
U.S. 294. 300-01 (1955) ("all deliberate speed").
144. Court decisions cannot be read, of course, in a political vacuum. They are designed to
influence the electorate and its representatives, thereby setting in motion the "dialectics of adjudica-
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F. Implications for Social Research
The perspectives on Brown's meaning bear implications for empirical
inquiry in school desegregation. So long as the remedial objective was
integration, social science also adopted an output perspective on research.
In the mid-1950's psychologists conducted small scale experimental stud-
ies on the social and personality effects of segregation. 4 5 In the mid-
1960's, sociologists gathered extensive cross-sectional data and applied
sophisticated multivariate analyses to examine the social and educational
effects of "natural" desegregation. 146 In the mid-1970's, similar large
scale surveys were done by revisionist sociologists on the effects of "in-
duced" desegregation via mandatory busing. 147 In all these instances, the
basic research question was "what is the effect of school segregation or
desegregation on certain outcomes?" The question presumed a global im-
pact of racial and/or social class composition on the dependent measures.
Researchers were interested in establishing first-order relationships. 148
There is a certain allure to the idea that heterogeneity in the schools based
on race and/or social class can bring about the educational and social mil-
lenium.
After the mid-1970's, coincident with the emergence of the effective
education movement, social scientists began to pay more attention to con-
ditions inside the schools. They noted that factors such as the nature of
intergroup contact and the social climate in the classroom can be as im-
portant as simple racial balancing, if not more so. Social psychologists
differentiated between "merely desegregated" and "genuinely inte-
grated" schools. 149 The former refers to the mere mix of races and im-
plies nothing about the quality of racial interaction that is a precondition
to effective learning. The latter involves the presence of those conditions,
tion": the process of action and reaction, influence and response, between the judicial and political
sectors of government. Present meaning is breathed into the Constitution as a result of these inter-
changes. See White, Tie Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 296-98 (1973).
145. See supra note 24.
146. See J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. McPARTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFELD& R.
YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
147. See Armor, supra note 21; Coleman, Kelly & Moore, supra note 21.
148. A "first-order" relationship, also known as a "main effect," refers to the association be-
tween any two variables, such as between racial integration of the classroom ("independent" or
predictor variable) and academic achievement of minority students ("dependent" or outcome vari-
able). A "higher-order" relationship or "interaction effect" refers to the association between any
two variables as mediated by the influence of a third variable or additional variables (e.g., classroom
integration is correlated with improved academic performance among minority students in elemen-
tary school but not in high school-school year is the mediating variable in this hypothetical). Most
complex social phenomena involve higher-order rather than first-order relationships, because in real
life everything is related to everything else.
149. Pettigrew, Useem, Normand & Smith, supra note 21, at 88.
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identified by Gordon Allport, as necessary for favorable intergroup rela-
tions: equal status, common goals, noncompetitive atmosphere, and insti-
tutional resources. 150 Researchers began to examine higher-order rela-
tionships. The question they asked was "under what circumstances can
schools maximize the desired outcomes?"
The through-put perspective directs researchers to think about the rem-
edy in terms of an on-going process rather than as a final product. It fo-
cuses attention not only on what goes into and what comes out of the
school system but also on the myriad of events that transpire in between.
School desegregation, in short, cannot be thought of as a kind of experi-
mental treatment in education. The analogy fails because desegregation
programs are not all alike. The quality of education may be entirely dif-
ferent in schools with the same racial balance because the conditions of
learning and interracial contact are different.151 It is unrealistic to expect
desegregation to have any across-the-board impact on educational perfor-
mance or any other outcome. 152 The emphasis now is on the situational
and other social factors that influence the result,1 53 and researchers are
undertaking in-depth, longitudinal studies of a given school or school dis-
trict in order to supplement the cross-section surveys of the past two
decades.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK
A. Styles of Judicial Decisionmaking
"Every legal decision," Justice Frankfurter noted, "is a function of
some juristic philosophy."1 54 In deciding a case, a judge's substantive
preoccupation merges with his implicit theory of law and his reasoning
style, and all impose patterns on his perception and resolution of the prob-
lem. A judge's notions of what law is and how decisions should be made
are also bound to affect his use, if any, of social science in reaching or
150. G. ALLPORT. TiiE NATUREOF PREJUDICE (1954).
151. For an example of induced desegregation without integration. see the Riverside. California
study of H. GERARD & N. MILLER. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION A LONG-TERI STUDY f1975). See also R
RIST. supra note 138 ("racial assimilation," i.e.. socializing non-white students to behave like white
students, may not constitute integration).
152. Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Acliievement: A Review o the Research. 42
LAW & CONTEMP PROBS., Summer 1978, at 17. 47: McConahay. The Effects of School Desegrega-
tion Upon Students' Racial Attitudes and Behavior: A Critical Review of the Literature and a Prole-
gomenon to Future Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP_ PROBS.. Summer 1978. at 77. 102.
153. For example, there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the earlier the grade level at
which desegregation occurs, the greater the positive impact on black achievement. Crain & Mahard.
supra note 152. at 34.
154. Quoted in H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, supra note 23. at 37.
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justifying the outcome. The issues of the school desegregation cases and
the related empirical studies need to be understood in their jurisprudential
setting.
There are three principal modes of judicial reasoning: formalism,
which flowered in the latter half of the nineteenth century and is known
also as conceptualism or mechanical jurisprudence; 155 legal realism,
which achieved primacy in the 1930's as a reaction against formalism; 156
and purposive analysis, also denominated policy analysis or reasoned
elaboration, which combined elements of formalism and realism to be-
come, since the 1950's, the principal methodology of contemporary ju-
risprudence. 157 All three have had a profound effect on American law.
The formalist conception of law was born at a time when American
society was relatively stable and the model of the physical world was
dominated by Newtonian mechanics. It consisted of a closed system of
rules, all neatly and symmetrically dovetailed with each other. The rules
embodied hidden ideas drawn from the dominant ideologies of the day
(laissez-faire and Social Darwinism) 158 and accepted as axiomatic. Deci-
sions in specific cases were then derived from these rules by the sole ap-
plication of logic. Plessy exemplifies formalist decisionmaking: starting
with the premise that it is impossible and unwise to change racial attitudes
by law, the Court then reasoned downward to the conclusion that legisla-
tion providing for separate but equal facilities was not invalid. Thus,
formalism saw decisionmaking as a deductive-syllogistic exercise, condi-
tioned on "the belief that justice must be administered in accordance with
fixed rules, which can be applied by a rather mechanical process of logi-
cal reasoning to a given state of facts, and can be made to produce an
inevitable result." 159 The conceptual fit between the result and the exist-
ing precedents was of greater importance than the social consequences of
the decision or its utility in advancing desired ends.
Steeped in this philosophy which left little room for empirical inquiry,
American law developed by disavowing change-that is, by denying ju-
155. See generally G. GILMORE, The Age of Faith, in THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); M.
HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
156. See generally W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris-
prudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930): White, From Sociological Jurisprudence
to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv.
999(1972).
157. See generally Dauer, Law and the Life of the Mind, 27 YALE L. REPORT, Winter 1980-198 1,
at 13; White, supra note 144.
158. See generallv P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE chs. 2-4 (1972) (detail-
ing Social Darwinism in the law and the rise of sociological jurisprudence).
159. Haines, General Observations of the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic hIflu-
ences in the Decisions of Judges, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 461-62
(1951).
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dicial choice. Formalist judges, committed to a quietistic role in govern-
ment, pretended merely to "find" rather than "create" law. 160 Law was
made, one assumes, by the judicial stork. In the formalists' view, a judi-
cial decision is not the law but only evidence of the principles of law. As
a falling apple is evidence of the law of gravity, so a decision is evidence
of the law that underlies it-law exists "out there," to be discovered by
the legal scientist (scholar) and then applied by the legal practitioner (at-
torney and judge). Although the social-economic values upon which
formalism was predicated are now outmoded, the style of reasoning re-
mains an integral part of the modem lawyer's intellectual equipment. The
process of extracting principles from past cases and applying them to de-
cide new ones is still the bedrock of legal analysis.
A new way of looking at the decisional process arose in the first third of
this century and it scorned rule-deductive decisionmaking as sterile non-
sense. It was called realism by its proponents because, like the realist
movements in art and literature, they sought to lay bare the ostensibly
"real" or "true" nature of law and legal reasoning. Starting with the
assumption that law is not a static code of rules but a dynamic method of
dispute resolution, realism described judicial decisions as ad hoc, dis-
cretionary responses to the unique facts and equities of specific cases.
Legal doctrines are after-the-fact justifications or rationalizations that
mask the real and usually unstated bases of decisions, which include "the
felt necessities of the time," "intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious," and "even the prejudices which judges share with their fel-
low-men." 1 61 By emphasizing the factual underpinning of rules, the be-
havioral impact of decisions, and the social policies served by law,
realism opened the door to empirical research in law. 162
This method of decisionmaking emphasizes choice. In every case,
there are at least two conflicting legal rules or premises that could be ap-
plied to the given facts. A confrontation of interests is what adjudication
is all about. If precedent is unavailable or undesirable, a judge has to
decide among alternative courses of action, and the one chosen will ex-
tend dominion over the case. Decisionmaking. then, is synonymous with
choosing. Nurtured by the reform spirit of the New Deal, realism
prompted a more forthright recognition of the lawmaking role of judges.
160. Formalism conceived of law as an inductive science. "'Adjudged cases are to judicial sci-
ence what ascertained facts and experiments are to the natural sciences.'" Hoover. Stare Decisis. 52
ALB. L. J. 73.73 (1895).
161. O. W. HOLNtFS. TitE CoMON LAW 1 (1881).
162. It was in this climate that social scientists began to be appointed to law faculties and courses
in law and social science began to be offered in law schools. See Stevens. Two Cheers for 1870: The
American Law School. in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 470-81 (1971): Schlegel. American Legal
Realism and Empirical Social Science: Front tie Yale Experience. 28 BUFFALO L. Rtv 459 (19791
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It exposed judicial creativity, but failed to come to grips with the basic
question in the calculus of choice: how does or should a judge choose
among competing rules and values?
The rise of the Axis Powers challenged the ideals of civilization and
justice. If one saw what Nazi judges did in the name of law, then the
realist method could be a prescription for authoritarianism. 163 Realism re-
duces the rule of the law to the rule of the judge; it calls into question the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in general and of judicial review in
particular. In the postwar years, American intellectuals began to disavow
moral relativism and search, once again, for unalterable moral princi-
ples. 164 A new generation of normatively-oriented scholars sought to ar-
ticulate the values of American culture that made it unique and distin-
guishable from totalitarian regimes. 165 One result was the emergence of a
jurisprudence aimed at using law as an instrument for attaining the ideals
for which this nation stood and for which it had fought on two continents,
the ideals of liberty and equality. It was in this climate that the Warren
Court delivered its opinions dedicated to egalitarianism: equality for ra-
cial minorities in schools 166 and in public life, 167 for the politically power-
less, 168 and for indigent criminal defendants. 169 Many of the movements
of the 1950's and 1960's-civil rights, consumerism, environmental-
ism-had their intellectual underpinning in the view of law as policy.
Purposive jurisprudence 170 views the judicial function as a self-con-
163. "Democracy versus the Absolute State means Natural Law versus Realism," cried the cri-
tics. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions to a Theory
of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEo. L.J. 493, 533 (1942). See also Palmer, Hobbes. Holmes
and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1945) (warning that the pragmatic, utilitarian approach to law, best
typified by Justice Holmes, could, in the end, lead to totalitarianism).
164. "We have begun to ask ourselves whether . . . there are not some standards of decency
so fundamental and so permanent that they may properly be described as absolute." Howe, The
Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 529, 545 (195 1). Others searched for transcen-
dental "neutral principles" for constitutional decisionmaking. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I (1959).
165. The function of law and law schools in a democratic society was the overriding theme of the
day. As stated by Lasswell and McDougal: "The proper function of our law schools is . . . to
contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic
values that constitute the professed ends of American polity." Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Educa-
tion and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest. 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943).
166. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167. Per curiam decisions after Brown desegregated public parks, beaches, buses and other as-
pects of public life. See New Orleans City Park Improvements Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(public parks), aff'g 242 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (public
buses), aff'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (public beaches and bathhouses), aff'g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (one person, one vote).
169. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to court-appointed counsel).
170. Purposive jurisprudence is an umbrella term that covers several more or less related ap-
proaches to the challenge posed by realism: (1) reasoned elaboration of the grounds of a decision, see
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scious weighing of competing value positions and a principled explana-
tion of the grounds of that normative choice. Like realism, it acknowl-
edges the active role of the judge in creating (rather than merely applying)
legal rules. Like formalism, it recognizes the obligation to provide a logi-
cally consistent and rigorously reasoned (rather than merely ad hoc) justi-
fication for the decision-a justification that sometimes rests on social
science, as in the Brown footnote. 171 Today, many in the legal commu-
nity "have adopted a point of view midway between traditional legal
formalism and rule-skepticism." 172
B. hnplications for Empirical Inquiry in Law
Empirical inquiry first came into law on a systematic basis with the
advent of legal realism. The rejection of the formalist orthodoxy went
hand in hand with the courtship of the social sciences. Realism yoked the
reformist politics of the pre-war period173 with the emerging quantitative
approach of the social sciences, 74 in an attempt to bring about social
amelioration via legal change and scientific fact-finding. 75 The court-
ship, however, was short-lived. Some of the reasons provide insights into
the limits of applying social research in law.
Although social science and legal realism were offshoots of the same
historical root, viz., social reform,176 by the 1930's they were growing in
different directions. Social scientists aspired to academic respectability
supra note 144: (2) articulation of the "neutral principles" that justify particular outcomes. see supra
note 164: (3) judicial capacity for moral leadership; (4) policy analysis based on assertedly demo-
cratic values and scientific inquiry, see supra note 165: (5) decisionmaking rooted in "background
morality," see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). For still other approaches. see C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
171. 347 U.S. at 494 n.l 1.
172. W. RUMBLE, supra note 156. at 54.
173. On the intellectual roots of realism in the progressivist heritage, see generally 0. GRAii AM.
AN ENCORE FOR REFORM (1967), and on its New Deal context, see White. supra note 156.
174. An emerging statistical ethos was the new wave in the social sciences in the 1930's. It was
spurred in part by the development of scientific sampling techniques in connection with New Deal
social programs. At the same time, the process of fragmentation of the unified 'social science" of
the late 19th century into the various "social sciences" as we know them today. was nearing comple-
tion. The specialist disciplines were institutionalized in separate academic departments: e.g.. psy-
chology split off from philosophy, and sociology from political science. See T. HASKELL. THE EIER
GENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAl. SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND TilE
NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977).
175. Dean Charles Clark of Yale. a leading realist, described the attempt to hybridize law and
social science as follows: "We regard facts as the prerequisite of reform." Quoted ti Schlegel. supra
note 162, at 468.
176. An intellectual origin of the social sciences is found in the progressive reform tradition. See
generally L. BERNARD & J. BERNARD, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SoCIOLOGY (1943): M. FURNER. ADVO
CACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMIERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE.
1865-1905 (1975).
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and political neutrality by severing their ties to social action and adopting
the language and manners of the physical sciences. 177 They became pre-
occupied with counting and niceties of experimental design. Realist law-
yers, on the other hand, soon found the quantitatively-oriented discipline
a difficult reform horse to ride. They disliked being hobbled by the meth-
ods of science and the constraints of data. The exigencies of change
shaped the nature and scope of their inquiry. For legal realists, reliable
data was less important than effective data. Their interest in empirical
facts rested more on expediency than on commitment to scientific knowl-
edge. 178
In addition, social science did not turn out to be directly and immedi-
ately applicable to the policy concerns of the law, however much it may
have illuminated the factual background of policy issues. 179 Perhaps the
fault lay not so much in the limits of social research methodology as in the
expectation of reformers that empirical data could yield or support norma-
tive conclusions. 180 In the end, the tension between the legal and scien-
tific methods of inquiry could not be overcome without each compromis-
ing its respective norms. Of the two facets of legal realism, the
philosophical and the scientific, the former-which gave the movement
its name and fame-flourished, while the latter-like an old soldier-
did not die but simply faded away.
Efforts to integrate law and social science continued in the post-realist
177. The differentiation of the social sciences into specialized departments has been linked to the
rise of the large-scale research university. The divorce of research from immediate policy considera-
tions was a precondition for recognition by the university community of the scientific status of the
newly formed departments. See T. HASKELL, supra note 174.
178. The experience with empirical research of William 0. Douglas at Yale was typical. With a
social scientist, he studied the causes of business failures and the efficiency of bankruptcy administra-
tion, a subject that then commanded widespread attention. To the dismay of his social science col-
league, he drew causal inferences and reached conclusions which were unwarranted by the results,
but which supported his reform expectations. "[N]ot only did he not follow the appropriate methodo-
logical rules, he reverted to the kind of arm-chair theorizing that methodological rules were designed
to foreclose." Schlegel, supra note 162, at 543.
179. In Stevens' view, "[t]he social sciences had been oversold. They proved to be of far less
help to the legal scholar than had been expected." Stevens, supra note 162, at 475-76. Robert
Hutchins, who co-authored several studies on the psychology of evidence with Donald Slesinger, a
psychologist, concluded that "[w]hat we actually discovered was that psychology had dealt with very
few of the points raised by the law of evidence; and that the basic psychological problem of the law of
evidence, what will affect juries, and in what way, was one psychology had never touched at all."
Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Laiv Student, I U. CIi. L. REV. 511,513 (1934).
180. A basic difference between the two modes of inquiry is that scientific statements are de-
scriptive and predictive, while the pronouncements of law are descriptive and prescriptive. Law
expresses human purposes. This is why decisions cannot be deduced simply from the facts to which
legal doctrines are applied, in the same manner that empirical conclusions can be derived from the
data to which scientific theories are applied. See generally Loevinger, Law and Science as Rival
Systems, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 530 (1966).
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period, but little progress was made.' 8' Normatively-oriented scholars
sought to meet the quandary of moral relativism, posed and unanswered
by the realists, by focusing on reasoned and orderly processes of judicial
decisionmaking. 182 Common to the various strands of purposive analysis
is a value-laden and data-free methodology. This is the jurisprudential
outlook that informs the legal critique of social research on school deseg-
regation, from the simple doll studies of the fifties 83 to the sophisticated
research on busing one generation later. 184 Today, compared to the
1930's, the positions of social scientists and legal scholars have been re-
versed. Many liberal and neo-conservative social scientists are engaged in
policy-oriented research. But many legal academics, unlike their realist
predecessors, are skeptical that the answer to the problem of the legiti-
macy of judicial review is found in instrumentalist-empirical analysis.185
Like the formalists of old, they urge a modest judicial role in social
policymaking. 186
V. IMPACT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH ON LAW
A. The "Indoctrination" Function: A Neo-Realist View
There is a substantial literature on "how to inform the judicial
mind" 87 of social science. It consists mostly of scholarly exegeses of
appellate decisionmaking,1 88 and, to a lesser extent, of reports by
181. Lasswell and MeDougal observed that the "[hieroic, but random, efforts [of realistsl to
integrate 'law' and 'the other social sciences' fail through lack of clarity about what is being inte-
grated, and how, and for what purposes." Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 165, at 204. They
proposed a comprehensive policy-science scheme that welded the intellectual themes of the 1930's:
empirical inquiry, policymaking, and rule-deductive reasoning. It marked the start of the post-realist
jurisprudence, but its social scientific underpinnings failed to appeal to other legal scholars who were
more normatively oriented.
182. The classic exposition is found in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN TIlE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958). Hence the prevalent notion among these schol-
ars that social science is all very interesting but essentially irrelevant to deciding issues of constitu-
tional dimension.
183. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Un-
certainty, in EDUCATION. SOCIAL SCIENCE. ANDTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1977).
185. See. e.g., Linde. Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972):
O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 9 119801:
Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism,. Reasoned Elaboration. and Social Science Research
in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CON'rEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57.
186. See. e.g.. R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977): L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976). There are also. of course.
social scientists who share the same viewpoint. See Moynihan. Social Science and the Courts. 54
PUB. INTEREST 12 (1979): Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary. 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975).
187. See supra note 2.
188. See. e.g., D. HOROWITZ, TtE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977): P. ROSEN. supra note
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judges, 189 lawyers, 190 and others191 with an insider's knowledge of the
litigation process. Wolf contributes a different perspective on the subject.
By studying the trial transcript, she arrives at observations about the im-
pact of social science on the judge that an examination of other sources of
information might not have disclosed.
In the Detroit case, much of the social science evidence introduced at
the trial was irrelevant and unnecessary under the existing law; hence, it
went unmentioned in the appellate opinions. Wolf argues that despite the
absence of any legal need for such proof, there is an underlying "pressure
to offer some semblance of plausible evidence to justify" desegregation
beyond reliance on case precedents. 192 Her assessment of the impact of
the expert testimony-admittedly "a hazardous and speculative under-
taking" 193-is that it "profoundly and greatly influenced" the trial out-
come. 194 "I am convinced," she said, "although I cannot prove the
point, that in Detroit, as in some other cases,"' 195 the testimony on resi-
dential segregation and the reciprocal effects on school segregation
aroused the judge's sense of wrong and provided him with the justifica-
tion for finding de jure violations by school officials. The testimony on
social-educational benefits "misled"' 196 the judge into believing that ra-
cially mixed classrooms were the necessary and desirable remedy. 197 In
essence, social science was "an important aspect of Judge Roth's indoc-
trination." 198
158; Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science Along the Judiciary's Constitutional Law Frontier, 66
Nw. U.L. REV. 455 (1971); Yudof, supra note 185, at 68-77.
189. See, e.g., Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Com-
ment, 39 LAW & CorNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 150; Doyle, Social Science Evidence in Court
Cases, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1977); Hallisey, Applied So-
cial Research as Evidence in Litigation, in THE UsEINONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
THE COURTS 135-39 (1980); Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of the Social Sciences in the
Judicial Decisionmaking Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Win-
ter 1975, at 134.
190. See, e.g., Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of their
Testimony in Litigation, 54 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1956).
191. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977).
192. E. WOLF, supra note 12, at 214.
193. Id. at 21.
194. Id. at 81.
195. Id. at 245. Wolf does not identify these other cases.
196. Id. at 101.
197. Id. at 81,245.
198. Id. at 119. A journalist covering the trial reached the same conclusion: "Without [Judge
Roth's] conversion, it is unlikely that the Detroit school case would have become very significant in
the history of school desegregation litigation." Grant, supra note 9, at 851. After the trial, Judge
Roth confided that the testimony on residential segregation was "the ke[y] to understanding the
case." Id. at 863. Equally remarkable was the mid-trial change of heart of Alexander Ritchie, coun-
sel for intervening defendants (the white parents resisting integration). Toward the end of the trial, he
conceded that Detroit was segregated with respect to housing and schools, and endorsed a metropoli-
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Social science reviewers seem persuaded by this brainwashing hypoth-
esis, 199 but a legal reviewer says that it may be "wrong.- 200 I find it
intuitively appealing but overstated. The intellectual progenitor of this
view of judicial decisionmaking is, of course, the radical faction of realist
jurisprudence. 20 1 In seeking a complete overhaul of formalism, realism
denied that legal precepts have any effect on case law except as after-the-
fact rationalizations of decisions. 202 It elevated emotional experiences
and personal history to first causes of judicial behavior;203 it made no ac-
commodation for purposiveness and ratiocination as springs of con-
duct. 204 In this view, judges do not begin with a legal premise from which
they reason downward to a conclusion. Instead, they begin backwards
with a conclusion vaguely formed, and then they try to substantiate it with
a legal premise. 205 The impulse for the result is an intuitive "hunch" of
what is right or wrong in a particular case. 20 6
Wolf is a latter-day realist attired in empirical clothes. Her selective
use and manipulation of data to support preconceived value positions is
tan remedy! His change moved the judge. "We all got an education during the course of the trial."
Judge Roth commented afterward. Id. at 863-64.
199. Ravitch, Social Scientists on the Stand. NEW LEADER. Feb. 8, 1982. at 19: Rossum. supra
note 112.
200. Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REV. 955. 956 (1982).
201. Not all realists marched under one flag. See generally Kennedy. Psvchologism in the Law.
29 Gro. L.J. 139 (1940) (opposing psychology as a basis for legal reform until more developed). The
middle-of-the-road faction also recognized that judicial decisions were shaped by societal and per-
sonal influences, but nonetheless believed that rules played an effective though limited role on the
totality of law. See Fuller. American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429. 430 (1934).
202. One of the 'chief uses" of legal rules is "to enable the judges to give formal justilica-
tions -rationalizations-of the conclusions at which they otherwise arrive." J. FRANK, LAN% AND
THE MODERN MIND 130 (1930).
203. "'IT he most salient [feature of the judicial process] is that decision is reached after an
emotive experience in which principles and logic play a secondary part." Yntema. The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws. 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1928). "An opinion is but the smoke" that
covers the underlying psychological processes. L. GREEN. JUDGE AND JURY 55 (1930).
204. A judge does not follow law, but law follows the judicial hunch-emotion and intuition.
not precedents or reasoning, control judicial decisions Hutcheson. The Judgment Intuitive: The
Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision. 14 CORNELL L. REV. 274 (1929). Certainty and ra-
tionality in the law were dismissed as a "myth." J. FRANK, supra note 202. at 2.
205. John Dewey observed that realism is pragmatism in law. "[Wlhile the syllogism sets forth
the results of thinking, it has nothing to do with the operation of thinking.'" Dewey. Logical Method
and Law, in LANDMARKS Ot LAW: HIGHLIGHTS OF LEGAL OPINION 122 (R. Henson ed. 1960).
206. In describing the art of advocacy, Cahn wrote: " [llf you wish a judge to overturn a settled
and established rule of law, you must convince both his mind and his emotions, which together in
indissociable blend constitute his sense of injustice .... His mind must see not only that the law has
erred but also that the law itself proffers a remedy. Then he can feel free to correct the error without
betraying the consistency and continuity of the legal order because he will only be replacing mistaken
law with correct law. . . . all this he may determine to do-if you are able to arouse the propulsive
force in his sense of injustice, i.e., the excitement of glands and emotions that any man may experi-
ence when he witnesses the inflicting of injustice." E. CAHN. THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
MAN 129 (1961).
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reminiscent of the realists' commitment of expediency to social science.
Hers is also a philosophy of debunkery-she seeks to debunk legal fic-
tions and unmask the pretensions of law with empirical evidence. In fact,
much of empirically-oriented impact research on law, which comprises
the bulk of social-legal scholarship, is preoccupied with debunking-it
exposes the gap between theory and practice, between the law-in-the-
books and the law-in-action. 207 Like the realists of the 1930's, Wolf (and
impact researchers generally) overstates her case. To suggest that deci-
sions are conditioned on emotive experiences triggered by expert testi-
mony, and nothing more, is to substitute the rule of the judge-or the
vicarious rule of the social scientist-for the rule of law. Realism fails to
explain how judges exercise their concededly discretionary judgment
without sliding into idiosyncratic or authoritarian decisionmaking. The
explanation supplied by purposive jurisprudence is that judicial intuition
of national values provides the basis for principled decisionmaking. Judi-
cial decisions express more than just personal hunches. They embody
values that are deemed inherent to American civilization at a given time.
To safeguard against the imposition of ad hoc, subjective preferences
upon society, the judiciary-unlike the other branches of government-
has to give written reasons that lay bare the whys and wherefores of its
judgments. 208 Political acceptance of judicial rulings depends in part on
whether they further perceived national ideals. In this normative scheme,
social science is necessary but not sufficient for law. Empirical evidence
may well elicit the psychological forces that animate a judgment, but the
legitimacy of the decision rests more on reasoned elaboration of its nor-
mative predicates. The next section locates Wolf's observations on the
impact of social research in a broader context.
B. Uses of Social Research in Judicial Decisionmaking
The role of social research in the courts is part of the broader subject of
how information about social reality ("what has already become''209)
contributes to shaping the way society should be ordered ("what is in the
207. The flexible, open-textured characteristic of legal doctrines and the instrumentalist, case-
by-case method of decisionmaking facilitates the maintenance of the duality between abstract ideals
and their implementation amid situational pressures. It is the very method of law that enables courts
to give lip service to exalted principles and at the same time justify a deviation from them in particular
instances. See Davies, Do Criminal Due Process Principles Make a Difference?, 1982 Am. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 247.
208. See White, supra note 144.
209. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 112 (1936).
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process of becoming" 210). It deals with the integration of the objectively
true with the morally right.
There is no single, elegant, and consensual link between the realms of
fact and value. 2 11 One way to map this role is in terms of judicial func-
tions. If decisions reflect some underlying jurisprudential philosophy.
then so do the applications of social research in decisionmaking. There
are three paradigmatic uses of social research 2 12-in judicial adjudica-
tion, judicial legislation, and judicial rationalization-which reflect. re-
spectively, the influence of three jurisprudential approaches to judicial
decisions: formalism, realism, and reasoned elaboration.
Law "consists of decisions, not rules." 2 13 It is a method of problem-
solving that applies a legal rule (a kind of prescriptive major premise) to
the facts of the case (minor premise) in order to reach a conclusion. The
rule or the facts may be certain or disputed. There are four possible cate-
gories of decisionmaking based on the foregoing combinations: certain
rule/certain facts, disputed rule/certain facts, certain rule/disputed facts.
and disputed rule/disputed facts. When the facts are certain, empirical
inquiry is unlikely to have any role. In the first category, litigation may
not even arise; the dispute would be settled by application of precedent.
The second category would involve nonfactual, doctrinal interpretation
and textual exegesis. Social science is relevant, then. only in the last two
types of decisionmaking.
1. Judicial Adjudication
When the rule itself is uncontested and only the facts are at issue, social
science evidence aids in determining the applicability of the rule-that is.
in judicial adjudication. For example, if studies show unequal resources
between black and white schools within a jurisdiction, the rule requiring
separate-but-equal educational facilities might lead to a decree of equal-
210. Id.
211. To paraphrase Kalven. the problem is one of how to "'empiricize" jurisprudence and 'in-
tellectualize" factfinding. Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal
Policy. in LA'\ IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56.72 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
212. It is difficult to give a generalized account on how social research is used by the courts.
There is no single. ubiquitous, across-the-board relevance of social science to law. See Grundstem.
The Relevance ofBehavioral Sctencefor Law. 19 CASE W. RES. L. Ri-v. 87 (1967). In part. this is
because "there exists no authoritative body of learning or generally agreed upon ideas on the subject
of how legal decisions are actually arrived at. to say nothing of how they ought to be arrived at."
Cowan. Decision Theory in Law. Science. attd Technology. 17 RUTGERS L. REs . 499. 508 (1963).
Styles of decisionmaking. and the uses of social science therein. vary according to the particular
subject matter and policies at stake. The three uses discussed in the text. therefore. exemplify but do
not encompass all the possibilities.
213. J. FRANK. supra note 202. at 128.
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ization of funding. It is a kind of programmed or prefabricated decision-
making-a jurisprudence of antecedents, which is associated with
formalism. Once the "adjudicative facts" 214 are ascertained, the judge
reasons from the governing rule to the inescapable conclusion. 215 The use
of social research here is not problematic-it does not lead to any change
in legal doctrine or policy.
2. Judicial Legislation
A more unsettled role of social research is in the creation of law-that
is, in judicial legislation. When both the applicable law and the facts are
at issue, as they were in Brown, a court must resolve conflicting claims of
"legislative fact" 216 and decide between opposing interests. It is a kind
of unprogrammed decisionmaking, used in original, first-impression
types of cases-a jurisprudence of discretion, associated with realism.
The presentation of empirical data on the disputed facts can influence
judge-made law either directly or indirectly.
A direct or instrumental role of social research is in ascertaining the
impact of decisions. 217 One ground for choosing between different legal
premises is an evaluation of their anticipated social and behavioral ef-
fects. 218 Decision implies choice, and choice implies prediction. Impact
research can help shape decisions because of the reciprocal relationship
between issues of fact and law. It is a central feature of the nature and
growth of law that "[the] issues of fact arise out of the law but, at the
point of application of law, the issues of law also arise out of the
facts.' '219 Existing legal rules give facts their legal significance, but facts,
in turn, can also beget new legal rules. 220 This result-oriented method of
214. These are facts specific to the case: who, what, where, and when. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958).
215. But see Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 236-39 (1966) (instances in which deliberate "bending" of the
facts are countenanced or dictated for reasons of legal policy).
216. These facts go beyond the particular lawsuit and look toward the future-they pertain to
broad social, economic, and behavioral processes. Adjudicative facts can also have legislative impli-
cations. K. DAvis, supra note 214. Of course, the line between "factfinding" and "lawmaking" is
often blurred at the point of application, since both kinds of decisionmaking may be proceeding
concurrently.
217. See Miller & Howell, supra note 107, at 690.
218. In the absence of consensus on desired ends, judges may not choose but instead accommo-
date or compromise between competing values. See supra text accompanying note 142.
219. Hart & McNaughton, supra note 23, at 61.
220. The "chicken-and-egg relationship" between issues of fact and law suggests a method for
collaboration between lawyers and social scientists in reform-oriented litigation. In the course of
identifying the legal issues, a lawyer can indicate to the social scientist the kinds of empirical data
that might be needed. Legal rules define the types of facts relevant for adjudication. An anti-segrega-
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decisionmaking 22 1 is not unique to law. It has parallels in "rational-com-
prehensive" and "scientific" decisionmaking in public administration
222
and organizational behavior. 223 Empirical evaluation and informed com-
mentary on the decisional products of a court are part of the lawmaking
processes of the judiciary. 224
Another direct role of social research is in formulating and implement-
ing remedies for proven constitutional violations. Although empirical
data may not be dispositive in establishing a wrong, it may help shape the
design of remedial decrees. Some courts, for example, now take into ac-
count the potential for white flight in determining the extent of desegrega-
tion, 225 and expert assistance has been used in preparing compensatory
education programs as alternatives or supplements to integration.
226
Nonetheless, there are judges and legal scholars who deny that social
tion rule might state, for example, that there is wrongful discrimination if there is substantial racial
imbalance in a school system as a result of deliberate actions by school officials. It is only when
segregation is deemed wrong (a normative judgment embodied in the rule) that one needs to inquire
about the facts of racial imbalance and official conduct-"The issues of fact arise out of the law."
Although the initial factual questions for investigation are posed by the lawyer. the social scientist
does not remain in a handmaiden's role. He may call attention to other facts which the lawyer had not
considered and which could alter the character of the legal issues itself. He might do research that
shows that segregated schooling produces harmful effects on minority children irrespective of
whether the segregation came about by deliberate action or fortuitous circumstances. The lawyer
could use these findings (if well established) to challenge the existing rule by arguing that these
effects are sufficient to find unlawful discrimination, without any further showing of improper official
motive. Here is an instance of using social research to help create new law. This is possible because
"at the point of application of law, the issues of law also arise out of the facts." As Hart and
McNaughton state, "'IT~he truth is that neither [the lawyer nor the social scientist] can be in complete
command. They have to learn how to work together . . .and each having a sense of the other's
potential contribution in developing the analysis." Id. at 61-62.
221. For a description of an "experimental jurisprudence" "based upon a rigorous application
of the scientific method" and designed to study "the effect of law upon society and the efficacy of
laws in accomplishing the purposes for which they came into existence." see F. BLUTNi-.. EXPIRItEN
TAL JURISPRUDE-NCE 18 (1957). Impact analysis consists of three interrelated components: prediction
of the effects of alternative rules: evaluation of the social impact of the rule chosen: and reformulation
of the rule in light of the evaluation. See Mayo & Jones. Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative
Thinkinig atnd the Predictive Function,. 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318. 339 (1964).
222. Lindblom. The Science of "Muddling Through." 19 PuB. AD. Ri-,. 79. 81 (1959)
223. See generallv H SIMON. ADMINISTRATIvE BEiHAVIOR (2d ed. 1957) (discussing decision-
making processes in administrative organizations).
224. Realists saw "thefocal point" of legal inquiry to be the "area of contact between tudicial
(or official) behavior and the behavior of laymen' that is. the social impact of law. Llewellyn.
supra note 156. at 442-43
225. See Parent Ass'n v. Ambach. 598 F.2d 705. 719 (2d Cir. 1979).
226. Although some social scientists argue that formulation of such decrees is "largely a matter
of applied social psychology." Haney, supra note 106. at 172. others caution that in the remed)
phase, as in the violation phase, social science findings-even when reliable and generally agreed
upon--"are not the primary factor in the decision to order the adoption of a particular plan." Levin.
School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research. 42 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS.. Autumn 1978. at 1. 2.
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research has any real effect on constitutional decisionmaking. 227 This
view encompasses two related issues. One is that of legitimacy: whether
empirical evidence should be relied upon at all in decisionmaking; the
other involves capability: how can it be used in decisionmaking.
Critics of judicial reliance on social science-many of whom, un-
surprisingly, also disfavor judicial activism 228 in social policymak-
ing 229-argue inter alia that it would provide a "rationale for noncompli-
ance and for open political attack on constitutional guarantees. "230 If
desegregation does not raise achievement scores of minority children, the
right is undercut by studies that challenge the factual predicate. Social
research findings are said to be inconclusive, subjective, and labile;231
therefore, constitutional principles should not be made to rest on the latest
empirical generalizations. 232 Normatively-oriented scholars assert that
judges should and in fact do "make interpretive rather than causal judg-
ments. "233
However, judges have the power to control the influence of social sci-
ence evidence; at the outset, they can frame the right in question in instru-
mentalist or normative terms. The right to desegregated education can be
227. "[Slocial science data or other evidence are less important in judicial decision-making in
the field of constitutional law than most people think." Doyle, supra note 189, at 10. "Social science
research has not played a very great part in school desegregation litigation." Yudof, supra note 185,
at 107.
This view, however, is not universally shared. "It is undeniable . . . that, since Brown, social
science research findings have played a role in school desegregation litigation." Levin, supra note
226, at 1. Judge McMillan observed that social science data "can add valuable information and
opinion to responsible judging-pragmatic, principled, or otherwise," and therefore "should be
considered by the court." McMillan, Social Science and the District Court: The Observations of a
Journeyman Trial Judge, 39 LAW & CON'EMP. PROBS., Winter 1978, at 157, 163, 157.
228. The argument that judges should be modest and not give free rein to their own policy prefer-
ences has been forcefully stated in O'Brien, supra note 185, at 16-17.
229. The association between social science and liberally-oriented judicial lawmaking is long-
standing. Social scientists, as a group, subscribe to liberal social and political values, a fact which
they readily acknowledge and have subjected to self-examination. Social science seeks to understand
and predict future events. It tends to attract to the profession those who are more interested in shaping
the future than in preserving the past. Teaching and research focus on "social change," not on the
"status quo." In this regard, Wolf and her neo-conservative colleagues represent a minority-but
growing-viewpoint.
230. Linde, supra note 185, at 240.
231. See infra text accompanying notes 256-63.
232. This is the criticism that Cahn, supra note 24, raised of the early doll studies, and which
since has been reiterated by other normatively-oriented commentators.
233. Yudof, supra note 185, at 77. "Interpretive" or value judgments are based on shared un-
derstandings and political morality. They do not imply quantitative, causal relationships-which.
arguably, cannot be unravelled anyway for complex, social processes, given the present state-of-the-
art of social research-but they locate "a particular phenomenon within a particular category of
phenomena by specifying its meaning within the society in which it occurs." Dworkin, supra note
184, at 21. The unexplained assumption is that judges are somehow more capable at value analysis
than fact analysis.
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premised on its purported academic benefits or on the imperative of vindi-
cating the interest in equality and fairness. Since the days of realism, we
all know that rarely are judicial decisions wholly or largely effective in
achieving their stated objectives, even though we continue to feign
amazement at the gap between the ideal and the real. 234 How the issue is
posed loads the dice. In any event, when judges have turned to social
facts, they have been careful not to place constitutional rulings exclu-
sively on the proverbial slippery slope of instrumentalist reasoning. They
have tread a middle ground, relying on both causal premises and norma-
tive judgments. 235
The difficult issue, then, is not whether social science has a role but
how it can be used. Kalven proposed that empirical inquiry is most pro-
ductive when it is applied to issues "in the middle range" of the fact-
value continuum. 236 These are issues which do not involve deeply held
values and inaccessible facts (e.g., the wrongfulness of segregation) or.
on the other hand, problems which involve facts too well known to war-
rant empirical footnoting (e.g., the unreliability of hearsay). Holdings
embodying a moral judgment are not, of course, grounded on factual
proof. If, as Brown said, segregation is "inherently unequal," its wrong-
fulness represents an axiomatic claim. Instrumental analysis becomes less
relevant as the questions become more aspirational.
It does not follow, however, that data may not have an indirect or heu-
ristic effect on shaping the outcome. What was claimed by legal critics of
Brown's footnote eleven to have been common knowledge about the con-
sequences of segregation was the product, at least in part, of the substan-
tial corpus of research that had accumulated over the years and worked its
way into popular learning and then into the living law. Even normative
conclusions are generated by an awareness of facts. Research results can
illuminate or sharpen the factual premises of constitutional decisionmak-
234. Abel. Redirecting Social Studies of Law, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 805. 827 (1980). argues
that this gap is a "'nonproblem." Attention should focus not on the existence of the gap but on the
reasons for its perpetuation and the consequences that follow therefrom. See also Davies. supra note
207 (discussing the divorce between legal principles and decisions in the British and American sys-
tems).
235. In Brown, for example, the Court stressed the "inherent" inequality of segregated schools.
an assertion which bespeaks a value judgment, in addition to citing the empirical studies in footnote
11. 347 U.S. at 495. In Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). the Court repeatedly pronounced
custodial interrogation to be permeated by "'inherent compulsion." in addition to quoting from em-
pirical texts on the coercive methods of police interrogation. Id. at 445-58.
236. Kalven. supra note 211. at 67. He does not articulate the parameters of this mid-range. but
Rosenberg gives a "'homely test" of whether an issue involves interpretive judgments not responsive
to empirical data: "Can you visualize evidence conceming the impact of your preferred version upon
human behavior or conditions that would lead you to reject that choice for an alternative one'? If not.
the choice is animated by value considerations." Rosenberg. Comments, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 199. 202
(1970).
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ing. Empirical reality defines what purposes are realizable and thereby
sharpens the focus of moral debate. 237 Whether intended or not, the use of
social science can also frame or redefine the policy issue. In school fi-
nance litigation, 238 for example, the opposing sides disagreed on the im-
pact of greater expenditures on educational quality, but implicitly they
(and the court) agreed that educational quality was measured by perfor-
mance on standardized achievement tests. 239 Social research channeled
thinking about the issue as a technical matter of improving test scores of
low-income minority children rather than as a moral dilemma posed by
economic inequality. In the Detroit case, expert testimony was a factor in
persuading the judge that improved achievement scores made school de-
segregation worth the candle. The indoctrination hypothesis is another
instance of the heuristic role of social science. 240
In brief, there is both a chasm and a bridge between the realms of fact
and value. Without the chasm, there would be no place for purposive
analysis-normative issues would surrender to empirical inquiry. With-
out the bridge, social research would have nothing to contribute to the
moral choices that preoccupy the law. The role of empirical inquiry in
judicial lawmaking is not an either-or matter. Both instrumentalist and
interpretive judgments are implicated because the empirical and the nor-
mative are interwoven. 241
237. Although social science cannot tell us which ends to pursue, it could channel the direction
of inquiry by disclosing the costs of their attainment. Homans, What Kind of a Myth is the Myth of a
Value-Free Social Science?. 58 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 530 (1978).
238. See generally Andersen, School Finance Litigation-The Styles of Judicial lntervention. 55
WASH. L. REV. 137, 164-67 (1979).
239. Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1975, at 217, 237 ("There is little doubt that the research agenda
has framed the issue."). See also Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano Among the Peo-
ple of Number, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 50 (1977) (observing that
only if the decisional norm adopted by the court poses social science questions will social science
research be relevant).
240. "[S]ocial science research may indirectly affect the legal process by changing or influenc-
ing ... the attitudes and beliefs of lawyers, judges .... Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of
Social Science Research in the Legal Process, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORDER 815, 820.
241. The circular relationship between law and facts-law defines the relevant facts, but facts
also beget new law, see supra note 220-suggests an analogous view of the relationship between
social values and social research. In the short run, values organize facts. Empirical inquiry cannot be
conducted, and its results cannot be interpreted, independently of the normative framework that pro-
vides its context and meaning. In the long run, however, facts can organize values. Over the course
of time, as reality unfolds into history, values can also arise out of facts. Knowledge can become a
source of authority for purposive action. Social research is a cumulative enterprise. Ideas and find-
ings, not of any single study but of the totality of established knowledge, can have a long term and
indirect influence on social judgments. For example, the insights into human behavior of Freud and
Skinner first caught hold of intellectual life and then gradually filtered into public consciousness.
They now shape how people think and feel. Perhaps this is what Kalven had in mind when he mused,
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3. Judicial Rationalization
The requirement that judges elaborate in writing the justifications for
their rulings serves as an institutional safeguard against idiosyncratic de-
cisionmaking. A third role of social research, then, is in the legitimation
of judicial lawmaking-that is, in judicial rationalization.
Although "in substance the growth of the law is legislative," 242 judges
are reluctant to engage openly in the function of creating law. In order to
preserve the appearance of continuity and certainty in the law, unpro-
grammed decisions are dressed in formalist attire. Landmark decisions
are said not to constitute "an abrupt break" with the past but merely a
"retur[n] to... old precedents." 243 Reform-minded judges, according
to the jurisprudence of reasoned elaboration, "decide cases intuitively
and then search to justify their intuitions by making arguments directed at
a wide audience.' 244 They intuit the values endemic to American society
at a particular time and then give elaborate reasons in order to persuade
the public of the legitimacy of their judgment.
Impact-thinking can be a form of rationalization in that it sets forth the
results-rather than the actual processes-of decisionmaking. To con-
sider all the possible consequences of alternative courses of action prior to
making a decision assumes a degree of rationality and information availa-
bility that is exaggerated. In law and in public administration generally.
there is often no agreement on desired ends, and decisionmakers are re-
duced to choosing without first clarifying the goals sought. Decisionmak-
ing is incremental245-a "muddling through" process in which each step
produces only a marginal change, and each decision is a successive ap-
proximation to the objective, even as the objective itself continues to
change under reconsideration. However, since decisionmakers are ex-
pected to justify their actions, they discharge their responsibility by pre-
tending to engage in "rational-comprehensive" analysis. 246
Some proponents of principled judicial decisions, while acknowledg-
ing that social research has some impact on adjudicative and legislative
functions, nonetheless object to instrumentalist justifications of deci-
"Iflor social science learning to have an impact on the living law. will it first have to become popular
learning and thus enter law via the normal political process?" Kalven. supra note 211. at 68.
242. O.W. HOLMES. TifE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
243. Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (right to appointed counsel). In requiring
certain warnings prior to police interrogations, the Court in Miranda said: "our holding is not an
innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized." Miranda v.
Arizona. 384 U.S. 436. 442 (1966).
244. White, supra note 144. at 300.
245. See Shapiro. Stability and Change in Judicial Dectston-Makoig: lncrementalisi or Stare
Decisis?. 2 LAw TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965).
246. Lindblom. supra note 222.
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sions.247 They insist that decisions be premised on "impartial, consistent,
and neutral application of legal principles," rather than on social science
materials. 248 Courts often do use empirical findings the way a drunk uses
a lamppost: for support rather than illumination. The findings serve to
ornament decisions reached on other grounds. If "the final business of
law is not truth but political preference,' '249 social research can be used
for purposes of "judicial statecraft. "250 Judges have been known to cite
studies the way they cite cases, treating scientific conclusions as highly
malleable holdings that can be assimilated into an existing normative
scheme.251
However, instrumentalist justifications need not necessarily be ad hoc,
any more than normative justifications are by definition "principled."
Decisions can be conditioned, at least in part, on well-established facts,
and done so in a consistent and coherent fashion. Indeed, if social re-
search influenced judicial thinking-for example, by helping to diagnose
the nature of the social problem, to anticipate the possible consequences
of alternative choices, or to inform on the prospects of public compli-
ance-it would be unjustifiable to pretend that such considerations never
entered into the decisionmaking. The "ought" cannot be derived from
the "is," but accurate knowledge of social reality can discipline or condi-
tion thinking so as to make possible the normative leap. The explication
of these factual predicates is not incompatible with purposive analysis,
unless one posits an unbridgeable gap between facts and values.
Thus, the imprimatur of "modern authority" in Brown helped to jus-
tify the avoidance of the Plessy doctrine which was itself rationalized in
terms of the "psychological knowledge" of its time. 252 The united front
of the social scientists, documented in footnote eleven, served the state-
craft purpose of reinforcing the image of broadly-based agreement 253 on
247. There are "certain benefits" in judicial attention to social science evidence, but to rest
decisions on them is "subversive to judicial craftsmanship per se and pernicious rather than salutary
for the prestige and efficacy of the judiciary." O'Brien, supra note 185, at 16, 19.
248. O'Brien, Of Judicial Myths, Motivations, and Justifications: A Postscript on Social Science
and the Law, 64 JUDICATURE 285, 287 (1981).
249. Kalven, supra note 211, at 67.
250. "Judicial statecraft" refers to the "calculation of the political consequences" of decisions,
in contrast to "judicial craftsmanship" which is a code word for sharply reasoned and non-activist
decisionmaking. Linde, supra note 185, at 232, 234.
251. A good example is Justice Blackmun's manipulation of the studies on the functioning and
impact of six- versus twelve-person criminal juries, which Justice Powell in a concurring opinion
derided as "numerology." Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 240 (1978) (Powell, J.. concurring).
See Loh, supra note 23, at 694-95.
252. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
253. The legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking rests not only on reasoned elaboration of its
premises but also on public acceptance of the rightness of the decision. This is the "ultimate secret"
of effective law. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91-92 (1970). In the
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the evil of segregation that the Court sought to convey with its own unani-
mous opinion. A lesson of Brown is that judges are more likely to use
social research for rationalization when the evidence is agreed upon by
the experts, it clearly supports or refutes the legal matter at issue, and it
implies a solution that is within the court's control. Absent these attri-
butes, as in the northern school desegregation cases, judges avoid any
overt justification based upon social research and rely instead on flexible
legal fictions such as dejure violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
A theme that emerges from the long history of school desegregation
from Brown to the present is that things are no longer as simple as they
appeared back in 1954. With respect to both legal policy and the associ-
ated empirical research, there is now more dissensus than consensus,
more complexity than simplicity, more indeterminacy than certainty.
"School desegregation," says Bell, "is our twentieth century equivalent
of the Christian Crusades. Once-clear issues are now hopelessly con-
fused. Goals that seemed reasonable are now unattainable. "254
Today, rarely does the wrong appear as overt and easily detectable as
the segregation statutes of yesteryear. School segregation is part of the
more general problem of "invisible race discrimination." 255 If an em-
ployer hires only on the basis of job qualifications but most of the suc-
cessful applicants turn out to be whites; if a police officer stops and ques-
tions only those suspected of crime but most of the suspects happen to be
blacks; if a school district seeks by its attendance policy only to preserve
the advantages of neighborhood schools but the result is mostly one-race
schools-if, in short, facially neutral policies or actions result in dispro-
portional racial impact, is there "invisible" discriminatory purpose with
the neutral justifications serving as racial surrogates, or is the outcome the
product of genuinely unbiased decisionmaking? A violation, once found,
no longer implies the predictable remedy of integration.
Empirical inquiry has also evolved along a similar path. As Judge Wis-
dom notes, "[t]here is a vast amount of solid research on school desegre-
gation . . . . But there is little agreement on methodology or conclu-
sions, even when the data relied on are the same ...... 256 The more
absence of consensus on what is right, legitimacy arises from the dialectical interchange between the
Court and the public: the initial decision may elicit a political response. which, in turn. leads to
legitimation or revision of the decision. This "dialectic of adjudication" between the judicial and
political processes has been described by White, supra note 144. at 296.
254. Bell, Book Review. 92 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1826 (1979).
255. J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW 134 (1974).
256. Wisdom, supra note 189. at 136 n. 18.
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sophisticated the studies become and the more the information gained, the
greater our sense of the complexity of the issues, the more apparent our
ignorance, and the more conflicting our explanations. When one thinks
about the assertions that were so confidently declared-that segregation
has negative psychological effects, period-based on some studies cited
in a footnote, it cannot but elicit a yearning for the simplicity of the past.
However, the assumption that increased knowledge should lead to im-
proved recommendations for policy reflects a misapprehension about so-
cial research. Thomstein Veblen pointed out that "the outcome of any
serious research can only be to make two questions grow where one ques-
tion grew before." 257 In the physical sciences, advances in research lead
to greater clarity about the phenomena and to convergence of conceptual
paradigms. 258 In the social sciences, the result is sometimes the opposite,
especially when the facts at issue are intertwined with normative consid-
erations. 259 Uncertainty in research conclusions exists not only because of
the epistemological limitations of the discipline, 260 but also because of
the values that precondition empirical inquiry and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the social purposes of the problem under study. 261 The fact that
social research at this time cannot provide law-like, predictive generaliza-
tions of complex social phenomena 262 does not necessarily mean, as some
legal scholars are bold to assert, that there is a "crisis of legitimacy" in
257. Quoted in Weinberg, supra note 69, at 241.
258. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
259. See Cohen & Weiss, Social Science and Social Policy: Schools and Race, in EDUCATION,
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72, 92 (1977) ("improved knowledge does not always
lead to more effective action").
260. Social science has not been successful in tracing complex, causal relationships. The forces
that shape social process are multiple and in continuing flux. Therefore, perceived patterns of rela-
tionships tend to be ephemeral, predictions have a wide margin of indeterminacy, and generalizations
are not invariable. These methodological issues of social research are discussed in E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION chs. 13, 14 (1961).
"Sociological-demographic" analyses of the kind proposed by Wolf to unravel the causes of school
segregation, see supra text accompanying note 80, rely at best on highly stylized conceptual models
that rest on heroic assumptions. Her causal statements should be read as "facts with a value signa-
ture." M. REIN, supra note 94, at 53. "[S]ocial science cannot develop a secure understanding of
causal relationships which will permit it to predict important social events. In this sense, social sci-
ence cannot be a science." Id. at 70.
261. On the competing normative paradigms that shape legal and empirical inquiry on school
desegregation, see supra parts III D & III E.
262. There are mixed views on whether social science can ever aspire to general laws of social
phenomena. Compare Yudof, supra note 185, at 109 (" '[T]hose who still wait for a Newton' of the
social sciences 'are not only waiting for a train that won't arrive, they're in the wrong station alto-
gether' ") (quoting Anthony Giddens) with Jones, Legal Inquir, and the Methods of Science. in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 120, 128 (H. Jones ed. 1967) ("genuinely scientific knowledge is
not unachievable in the social sciences"). One need not, of course, resolve the issue to assert that
social science can have a role in judicial decisionmaking.
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the social sciences which casts "widespread doubts" as to their "rele-
vance" for constitutional decisionmaking. 263
So long as one expects social science to provide guidance in policy
decisions, that is, to serve a deterministic role in the judicial process, one
is bound to be disillusioned and to want to cast (as some judges had
done) 264 a pox on both liberal and revisionist houses of social science. On
the other hand, if one sees that social science plays mainly a heuristic role
in policy matters, educating the courts and society at large about the
factual dimensions of the issue at stake, 265 one begins to appreciate its
uses and limits in judicial decisionmaking. It can expose the varied facets
of social problems and stimulate further reflection on the adequacy of
one's preconceptions. It might prompt a different view of the issue and
expand the range of alternative solutions. In short, it can inform and make
more responsible the exercise of judgment, even though it should not and
cannot displace the act of judging itself.2 66 "How to inform the judicial
mind" 267 of social science yields no easy solutions. One can, however.
take comfort in the fact that although social science might not answer all
the questions about school desegregation, it could make us wiser about its
mysteries.
263. Yudof. supra note 185, at 71. See also Frankel. The Autonomnv of the Social Sciences. in
CONTROVERSIES AND DEciSIONS 9, 29 (C. Frankel ed. 1976). noting that -[t]he social sciences... are
inextricably involved in politics.'
264. See supra note I I .
265. Applied social research. Cohen and Weiss suggest. "constitutes a form of reporting to soci-
ety " It is a vehicle by which society learns what is happening regarding the effects of social policies.
Because of the selection and interpretation of evidence by researchers, the reporting is also an attempt
to influence what society leams. Cohen & Weiss, supra note 259. at 79.
266. In a pluralistic world with conflicting social values, it is not unexpected and no disgrace to
find dissensus among the experts on social facts. These uncertainties stimulate debate about social
purposes. If there were no dilemmas because facts resolved the ethical issues, there would be no
opportunity for moral discourse on human affairs. The surrender of ethics to science is "at war with
the very purpose and the principal miodus operandi of a free society.'" Hart & McNaughton. supra
note 23. at 72.
267. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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